University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2014

The Limits of Enumeration
Richard A. Primus
University of Michigan Law School, raprimus@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1417

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legislation Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Primus, Richard A. "The Limits of Enumeration." Yale L. J. 124, no. 3 (2014): 576-642.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

A .576.PRIMUS.642.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/14/14 2:51 PM

Richard primus

The Limits of Enumeration
a b s t r a c t . According to a well-known principle of constitutional interpretation here identified as the “internal-limits canon,” the powers of Congress must always be construed as authorizing less legislation than a general police power would. This Article argues that the internallimits canon is unsound. Whether the powers of Congress would in practice authorize any legislation that a police power would authorize is a matter of contingency: it depends on the relationship between the powers and the social world at a given time. There is no reason why, at a given
time, the powers cannot turn out to authorize any legislation that a police power would. This
Article explains why setting aside the internal-limits canon is consistent with the interests of federalism, with fidelity to the Founding design, and with the text of the Constitution.

a u t h o r . Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor, the University of Michigan Law
School. For comments on previous drafts, I thank Evan Caminker, Richard Friedman, Abbe
Gluck, Kelly Hagen, Scott Hershovitz, Don Herzog, William Novak, Kermit Roosevelt, and
Dayna Zolle. Thanks also to Akhil Amar, Samuel Bagenstos, Nicholas Bagley, Scott Bloomberg,
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Kristina Daugirdas, Monica Hakimi, Rick Hills, Gerard Magliocca,
Charles Primus, Romana Primus, Adam Pritchard, Eli Temkin, and David Uhlmann, as well as
the participants in faculty workshops at the University of Michigan Law School and the University of Notre Dame Law School. The title of this Article is of course reminiscent of Gil Seinfeld’s
Article I, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1389 (2010); I thank Seinfeld
for his long-running and productively skeptical engagement with the idea presented here. Research for this project was funded in part by the Cook Endowment.
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in t r o d u c t io n
“The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.”
—Chief Justice John Marshall, Gibbons v. Ogden1
The federal government is a government of limited and enumerated powers. Every law student learns this formula. And so close on its heels that it
sometimes seems to be the same idea, another principle follows: there are
things Congress cannot do, even without reference to affirmative prohibitions
like those in the Bill of Rights. For ease of reference, we can call the first idea
the enumeration principle, and, for reasons to be explained just below, we can
call the second idea the internal-limits canon. So long as it is properly understood, the enumeration principle is a sound tenet of American constitutional
law. But the internal-limits canon is not. The purpose of this Article is to explain why the internal-limits canon, for all its familiarity and broad acceptance,
is wrong.
In referring to the idea under consideration as the internal-limits canon, I
draw on a useful typology that divides limits on congressional power into three
kinds.2 Internal limits are the boundaries of Congress’s powers taken on their
own terms. For example, the power to govern the District of Columbia3 can be
used to write a fire code for the District of Columbia, but it cannot be used to
write a fire code for Delaware. This limit is “internal” to the power itself,
meaning that the limit inheres in the definition of the power. External limits, in
contrast, are affirmative prohibitions that prevent Congress from doing things
that would otherwise be permissible exercises of its powers. Thus, the
Fifteenth Amendment prevents Congress from conducting whites-only elections in the District of Columbia, despite Congress’s power to govern the District. The rule against racial discrimination in voting is not conceptually part of
the power to govern the District; before the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress could use that power to conduct racially restrictive elections.
The Fifteenth Amendment creates a separate constitutional rule that pushes
back against the grant of power and thus limits that power “externally.”4 Final-

1.

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).

2.

See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 297 (2d ed. 1988).

3.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.

4.

The content of particular external limits is thus not determined by the answers to questions
like, “Does this legislation constitute governance of the District of Columbia?”, “Does this
legislation regulate interstate commerce?”, or “Does this legislation define or punish piracy?” Instead, external limits are analyzed with questions like, “Does this legislation abridge
the freedom of speech?” or “Is this law a bill of attainder?”
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ly, there are process limits, such as the bicameral legislature, the requirement of
presidential presentment, and frequent democratic elections. Unlike external
limits, process limits do not place particular substantive outcomes wholly out
of reach. But they raise the cost of federal action, thus diminishing the likelihood that Congress will do any particular thing, especially any particular thing
that might arouse substantial opposition.5
Process limits and external limits are consequential forces constraining
modern federal governance. Internal limits are not. Indeed, for much of the
twentieth century, many people suspected that internal limits had lost all practical significance.6 Judicial doctrine constrained Congress on the basis of prohibitions like those in the Bill of Rights, but broad constructions of the Commerce Clause made it hard to identify enforceable limits on Congress short of
those affirmative prohibitions.7 At the level of principle, though, the idea that
the Constitution demands a meaningful set of internal limits lived on.8
Defenders of federal statutes have always needed to answer the question, “If
Congress can do that, what can’t Congress do, other than the things the Constitution specifically forbids?”9 That question played a famously large role in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).10 And in the wake of

5.

See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1321 (2001).

6.

See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and Disdain,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2012) (surveying this suspicion between the 1940s and the
1990s); Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV.
1389, 1391 (2010) (identifying the idea that internal limits lack practical force as “the standard story”).

7.

See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 318 (rev. ed. 2014) (describing near-plenary congressional power as the practical
consequence of prevailing doctrine); see also Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 3 n.9 (2013) (collecting many expressions of this view).

8.

See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1987) (insisting on the continued validity of the principle); Donald H. Regan, How to
Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94
MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995) (taking the idea of a limiting enumeration as a longstanding principle worthy of continued respect).

9.

See, e.g., Oral Argument at 4:52, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260)
(“If . . . Congress can reach under the interstate commerce power, what would be an example of a case which you couldn’t reach?”), http://www.oyez.org/api/media/sites/default/files
/audio/cases/1994/93-1260_19941108-argument.mp3 [http://perma.cc/J7YM-V5GJ].

10.

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) [hereinafter ACA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)); see JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH 272-82 (2012) (describing the
role of the internal-limits canon in the struggle over the ACA).
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NFIB, constitutional lawyers wonder whether the internal-limits canon—that
is, the principle that the powers of Congress must be construed as meaningfully constrained by internal limits—might be deployed in seriously consequential
ways.11
Now is the time, therefore, for a frontal debunking of the internal-limits
canon. It is my aim in this Article to show, despite longstanding orthodoxy to
the contrary, that Congress’s powers might in practice authorize the enactment
of any legislation that would be justified by a grant of general regulatory authority. “Might” is an important part of the claim. In my view, whether the
powers of Congress have as great a scope in practice as a general police power
is a matter of contingency, not a matter of principle. The question can only be
answered by examining the powers and applying them sensibly to the social
world. But in the course of that analysis, no constitutional principle bars the
conclusion that Congress’s enumerated powers in practice authorize as much as
a police power would.
Measured by the conventions of constitutional discourse, rejecting the internal-limits canon would be a radical step. A familiar trope among constitutional lawyers would deem it an obvious mistake. “Of course the powers of
Congress are inherently limiting,” this argument says. “After all, the powers of
Congress are specifically enumerated in the Constitution. If Congress had general legislative power, the Constitution would have said that, rather than
providing a list of particular powers. That’s what Chief Justice John Marshall
meant in Gibbons v. Ogden when he said that the enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated.”12
Now it happens that this familiar way of invoking Marshall’s Gibbons dictum may not get the great Chief Justice quite right, in part because it misses a
nuance in the word “presupposes.”13 But more importantly, it isn’t true that
11.

See Karlan, supra note 6, at 63-64 (noting uncertainty about whether the commerce and
spending powers will meaningfully contract after NFIB’s strong signal of the Court’s willingness to limit legislation); Solum, supra note 7, at 37-38 (suggesting that Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), is now a contestable case).

12.

See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824) (“The enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated.”); see also Regan, supra note 8, at 556 (“The mere fact of an
enumeration of powers makes it clear that the federal government’s powers are meant to be
limited.”).

13.

Presupposing a condition differs from requiring that the condition be treated as true. See
infra Part IV.B. It is also worth noting that Chief Justice Marshall was referring to the enumeration of three types of commerce within Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, not the enumeration of powers from Clause 1 through Clause 18 of Section 8. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196.
Perhaps Chief Justice Marshall’s assertion about the particular presuppositions of the enumeration in Clause 3 implies parallel presuppositions about the enumeration in all of Section
8—or, more to the point, for the enumeration of Congress’s powers throughout the whole
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enumerations of specific authorities are always more limiting than general authorizations would be. Yes, specific lists are probably specific for a reason, at
least most of the time, and “Congress can do these eighteen things”14 might
seem like a funny way of authorizing Congress to legislate however it thinks
best, subject to the limits of the political process and the affirmative prohibitions specified elsewhere in the Constitution. But as a conceptual rule, the
claim that enumerated authorizations are always more limiting in practice than
general authorizations is too sweeping. Consider this example: is “you can have
chocolate, vanilla, or strawberry ice cream for dessert” more limiting in practice
than the general authorization “you can have ice cream for dessert”? The answer on any given day might be yes or it might be no. It depends on the contents of the freezer.15
Obviously this enumeration differs from the Article I enumeration in many
ways, but it should bring the basic point into view: whether a list of specific
authorizations is in practice more limiting than a general authorization depends on facts about that particular enumeration and the circumstances in
which it is applied. So the mere fact that the Constitution includes an enumeration of congressional powers cannot demonstrate that the internal limits of
those powers leave Congress unable to regulate something that a police power
would let Congress reach. If the powers of Congress must be construed as collectively less extensive than a police power, it has to be for some other reason.
Prevailing constitutional opinion furnishes three such reasons, sounding in
the traditional categories of text, history, and structure. As a textual matter, the
argument runs, Article I and the Tenth Amendment both indicate that the
enumerated powers are internally limited.16 Historically, the Founders saw the
Constitution. But perhaps not; different enumerations may have different presuppositions.
For examples of enumerations that do not presuppose things unenumerated, see infra Part
IV.B.
14.

Eighteen is the number of power-conferring clauses in Article I, Section 8. It is worth remembering, though, that the Constitution confers power on Congress in many places other
than that section. For example, the power to decide the manner of elections for the House of
Representatives is conferred in Article I, Section 4, and the power to make rules respecting
the property and territory of the United States is specified in Article IV, Section 3. Counting
conservatively, the original Constitution contains eleven clauses granting power to Congress
outside the enumeration in Article I, Section 8; the amended Constitution contains twentyfive. So although it may make sense to regard the powers affirmatively delegated by the
Constitution as exclusive, it is not straightforward to think of the list in Section 8 as indicating that exclusivity. (The Tenth Amendment is a better choice as support for that proposition.)

15.

For other examples, see infra Part IV.

16.

See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-89 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that affording Congress the equivalent of plenary power would make nonsense of Article
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enumeration as a device for limiting Congress.17 Structurally, a federal police
power would let Congress eclipse the state governments and destroy the federal system.18 These arguments have some plausibility, and they enjoy a long
pedigree in constitutional thought. But on their merits, they are less than compelling.
The textual grounding for the internal-limits canon, I suggest, is powerful
if one already believes that congressional power must be internally limited. But
without that presumption, the text is more easily read to permit Congress’s
enumerated powers to go wherever they might lead.19 As a matter of history,
most of the Founders did see enumeration as a strategy for limiting (and invigorating) the federal government. But enumerating the powers of Congress was
only one of the Founders’ strategies for limiting federal power, and fidelity to
their design does not require forcing that strategy to do the job if it does not
work very well and other constitutional strategies are more up to the task.20 Finally, the federal structure of American government has long been maintained
not by internal limits on Congress’s powers but by a combination of external
limits, process limits, and the practical conditions that shape interactions between federal and state officials.21 There is no reason to believe that these devices deliver optimal federalism, partly because there is no reason to believe that
any set of tools could yield that outcome. But there is also no reason to think
that a better brand of federalism would result if some consequential set of internal limits were added to the mix. In sum, internal limits are not mandated
by the text of the Constitution, not required by fidelity to the Founding, and
neither necessary nor materially helpful for promoting federalism.
So am I saying that Congress is authorized to do whatever it wants? Of
course not. For one thing, the whole panoply of external constitutional limits is
firmly in place. Congress may not establish Christianity,22 abolish jury trial,23
I, Section 8); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (describing the Tenth
Amendment as indicating that the enumerated powers of Congress are inherently limited);
Regan, supra note 8, at 556. The Tenth Amendment may also be a source of external limits.
See infra Part IV.
17.

See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577-78 (2012) (invoking this Founding attitude); BARNETT, supra note 7, at 277 (same).

18.

See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (describing the enumeration as limiting the scope of federal
power to something narrower than state power, thus promoting the benefits of federalism).

19.

See infra Part IV.

20.

See infra Part III.

21.

See infra Part II. See generally Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485
(1994) (analyzing the significance of these forces to the operation of American federalism).

22.

U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
. . . .”).
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commandeer a state legislature,24 or unilaterally combine the two Carolinas into a single state.25 Nor am I arguing that the commerce power (or the union of
that power and the rest of Congress’s powers) authorizes all possible legislation except what the external limits prohibit. In other words, I am not arguing
that the Constitution confers the equivalent of plenary power on Congress. It
might, or it might not, depending on the best constructions of many different
powers and the relationship between those powers and the social world at any
given time. My argument takes no position on whether the Constitution authorizes Congress to do whatever a national government with a police power
could do. Instead, my argument is that the answer to that question is a matter
of contingency, rather than a categorical “no.” In the course of analyzing the
scope of any congressional power, I contend, one should not exclude an otherwise reasonable construction on the grounds that it would leave Congress constrained only by process limits and affirmative prohibitions.26
My argument also says nothing about the wisdom, as opposed to the permissibility, of federal legislation. State and local decision making is often better
than central decision making, and Congress is often well advised to leave issues
in the hands of local officials. Indeed, it might be sensible to say that Congress
should prefer local decision making except where some reason suggests that
regulation be federal, albeit on the understanding that there are many reasons
why federal regulation is sometimes the right choice.27 States today exercise a
great deal of consequential governing authority. That is a healthy condition,
and for reasons explained in this Article it would remain the case even if the internal-limits canon disappeared. So the argument here is not that all law
should be federal, nor even that more law should be federal than currently is.
Congress should consider the virtues of local decision making before enacting

23.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury.”).

24.

See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

25.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.

26.

Note that “affirmative” here does not mean “affirmatively specified in the text.” It means
affirmative in the same sense as “affirmative defenses” elsewhere in the law. An external limit, like an affirmative defense, operates in the presence of a prima facie reason for going the
other way. That is, even where some enumerated power of Congress would otherwise authorize federal legislation, an external limit blocks the exercise of that power, just as an affirmative defense blocks a plaintiff or a prosecutor from making out an otherwise successful
legal case. Many external limits are indeed specified in the text; depending on how capaciously one reads the text and how willingly one rejects principles that do not seem textual,
the total proportion of external limits that is textually specified might be higher or lower.
But the textuality vel non of a constitutional rule is orthogonal to the issue of whether it is
an external limit.

27.

Cf. Regan, supra note 8 (developing a similar view).
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legislation, and judges should disallow laws that violate principles of federalism by contravening external constitutional limits on congressional power,
some of which are associated with the Tenth Amendment.28 But the worry that
sustaining a given law would make it impossible to identify meaningful internal
limits on congressional power is not a sufficient reason to deem that law invalid.
These limitations on the scope of my argument should not conceal the importance of rejecting the internal-limits canon. As noted above, constitutional
practice long featured a disjuncture between the official theory of a limiting
enumeration and a de facto settlement whereby internal limits did virtually
nothing to constrain federal law.29 From the New Deal until United States v.
Lopez30 and United States v. Morrison,31 the Supreme Court enforced no internal
limits. Even after Lopez and Morrison, workarounds like the reenacted GunFree School Zones Act32 and the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich33 seemed
to indicate that Congress could pursue pretty much any regulatory project for
which it had the political will, assuming no transgression of external constitutional limits. Some commentators saw the practical reality of plenary congressional power as cause for alarm,34 and others regarded it as far less troubling.35
But even thinkers basically content to let Congress exercise general legislative
power have been mostly inclined to let that arrangement persist as a fact in tension with official norms, rather than offering direct justificatory arguments in
its support based on traditional sources of constitutional authority.36 More or

28.

I use the phrase “associated with” because the text of the Tenth Amendment, read literally,
does not announce external limits. It specifies the consequences of internal ones. Nonetheless, the Amendment is often used as a placeholder for external limits. See infra Part IV.

29.

See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.

30.

514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990).

31.

529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil remedy of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994).

32.

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)
(2012)) (criminalizing the possession within a school zone of “a firearm that has moved in or
that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce”).

33.

545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the application of the Controlled Substances Act based on the
Commerce Clause against an individual growing marijuana for non-commercial use).

34.

See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 7; Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1950); Epstein, supra note 8.

35.

See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 21, at 1496-1503.

36.

See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175,
1192 (1996) (saying that as a practical matter the federal government now enjoys nearly plenary power but not offering interpretive arguments justifying that arrangement); Karlan,
supra note 6, at 43.
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less across the ideological spectrum, theorists and practitioners offer at least
pro forma affirmation of the internal-limits canon.37 As a result, the canon has
persisted as a stock idea in constitutional law. To paraphrase Justice Robert
Jackson, it lies about like a loaded weapon.38
So long as mainstream constitutional decision makers lacked the inclination
to invalidate important federal legislation on internal-limits grounds, this consensus at the level of principle had little significance at the level of practice. But
in the controversy over the Affordable Care Act (ACA),39 the internal-limits
canon threatened to become the vehicle for an enormously consequential statutory invalidation—one that would in principle have been subject to a workaround but which in practice would have killed a major legislative program.40
Critics of the ACA demanded to know what Congress couldn’t do, short of bypassing external limits, if the individual mandate was valid law.41 Supporters of
the ACA lacked the option of saying, “Well, maybe nothing, and that’s all
right.” That response would have identified the ACA’s supporters as constitutional heretics. But it shouldn’t have: the internal-limits canon is not entitled to
the persuasive force it now enjoys.
In the post-NFIB world, it is important to explain why not, lest the canon
facilitate the invalidation of important legislation that should rightfully be
deemed constitutional. To be sure, it hasn’t happened yet. NFIB upheld the Affordable Care Act, and the internal-limits canon might still continue its long
career of solemn invocations followed by little or nothing in the way of consequences. But in the wake of NFIB, some mainstream constitutional thinkers
have begun reviving old ideas about internal limits.42 The question of whether
we stand on the brink of a constitutional gestalt shift has been squarely

37.

See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 469 (2009); John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2004-05 (2009); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress,
Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1513 (2007).

38.

Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon . . . .”).

39.

42 U.S.C. §§ 18001 et seq. (2012).

40.

The relevant workarounds are possible only when the political branches desire to reinstate
the substance of the invalidated legislation. See infra Part I. With a Republican majority in
the House, Congress in 2012 would not have passed another statute reproducing the policy
of the ACA.

41.

See generally TOOBIN, supra note 10 (chronicling the role of this question in the NFIB litigation).

42.

See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Genevieve Lakier, “To Regulate,” Not “To Prohibit”: Limiting the
Commerce Power, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (2012) (proposing that the commerce power be construed as not conferring the power to shut down a given interstate market).
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posed.43 In the next phase of discussions about federal power, the widespread
sense that everyone accepts the internal-limits canon will distort the analysis
and tilt the playing field. To prevent that distortion, it is important for theorists and practitioners to recognize that traditional sources of constitutional authority might, as a practical matter, authorize Congress to make any law not
prohibited by some external limit—and that such a conclusion should not be
worrisome.
In Part I of this Article, I lay out the logic of the internal-limits canon. In
Part II, I explain why federalism does not require congressional power to be
internally limited. In Part III, I explain why fidelity to the Founding does not
require the internal-limits canon. In Part IV, I explain why the text of the Constitution does not require it either.
Finally, a comment on the Article’s organization. Constitutional analyses
standardly discuss arguments from text, history, and structure in precisely that
order: text, history, structure. The body of this Article deliberately reverses the
sequence: structure, history, text. The point of this unconventional ordering is
to enable readers to assess my analysis of the Constitution’s text with a clear
understanding of the structural and historical analyses that make the textual
reading sensible. After all, constitutional interpreters generally (and reasonably) read ambiguous texts so as to render them sensible in light of considerations about history and structure. An interpreter’s sense of the relevant history
and structure will push him toward some possible readings of text rather than
others. Indeed, a textual reading that seems natural or intuitive given one set of
assumptions about history and structure might seem forced and implausible
given another set. In the past, when interpreters have overwhelmingly read the
Constitution’s text to support the internal-limits canon, they have not done so
on the basis of the text simpliciter; they have done so while approaching the text
through a set of assumptions about history and structure. In what follows, I lay
out a structural account of the role of internal limits within American federalism and a historical account of internal limits in the Founding design; both accounts are intended to correct prevailing misconceptions. With better understandings of history and structure, a better reading of the text comes more
clearly into view.

43.

586

See Solum, supra note 7, at 2 (stating that NFIB destabilized the regnant “constitutional gestalt”).
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i. t w o id e a s
A. The Enumeration Principle
The Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers is generally associated with the project of ensuring a federal government that is vigorous but
limited. The virtues of limited government as a general matter have been extensively catalogued, and there is little need to offer a comprehensive recapitulation here. Briefly, limited government at both the local and the national level
is necessary for individual liberty and for the many forms of human flourishing
that individual liberty enables.44 Limitations on central power in particular preserve space for meaningful autonomy at the state and local levels and therefore
for a range of benefits that the literature on federalism has made familiar.45 The
constitutional system accordingly needs to consider which decisions should be
made centrally and which should be made locally, as well as what limits there
are to what any government may do.
Enumerating congressional powers was one of several Founding-era strategies for pursuing these ends. The foremost strategy was that of process limits,
which is to say that the whole structure of power and office-holding that the
Constitution created is properly understood as a set of devices for constraining
the federal government as well as empowering it. For example, frequent elections were expected to keep Congress from enacting oppressive legislation, and
a Senate composed of ambassadors from the state legislatures was expected to
ensure that the federal government respected the prerogatives of state governments. The Founders also made use of external limits: both in the original
Constitution and in the Bill of Rights, they specified affirmative prohibitions
that Congress could not transgress.46 And most relevant for purposes of the
present discussion, the Founders deployed a strategy of internal limits by

44.

Some collectivist theories (Rousseau’s, perhaps, or certain forms of modern socialism) may
point in a different direction, but to the extent that they do, they lie outside the liberal tradition from which American constitutional thought grows. See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE
LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955). It may also be worth noting that the recognition that limited
government is conducive to individual liberty need not deny that governance is sometimes
liberty-enhancing. Government and liberty are not always opponents in a zero-sum game.
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27-28 (1961) (describing laws that facilitate and extend the power of the people to whom they apply—for example, laws making it possible to
enter into enforceable contracts or to dispose of property by will—rather than limiting their
freedom).

45.

See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.

46.

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; id. amend. I.
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providing that Congress would have only those powers affirmatively given to
it. If Congress has only particular powers, the intuition runs, then its jurisdiction is narrower than if it possessed a general police power.
The idea that Congress has only those powers that are affirmatively given
to it is fundamental in constitutional law, and constitutional lawyers typically
invoke that idea by saying that the federal government is a government of
enumerated powers. But there is some uncertainty about whether the best interpretation of the enumeration principle understands the phrase “enumerated
powers” literally or as a term of art. In a literal sense, the “enumerated powers”
of Congress are those listed in Article I, Section 8, as well as those listed in
many other parts of the Constitution.47 It is commonly said that Congress can
act only on the basis of its enumerated powers.48 But constitutional practice has
been more complex, because the Supreme Court has periodically recognized
congressional powers arising implicitly from the constitutional structure rather
than from any express grant of particular authority. Examples include implicit
powers in foreign affairs,49 the now-defunct power to enforce the Fugitive
Slave Clause,50 and, at the limit, the power to do all things necessary to protect
the federal government from destruction.51 If these examples and others like
them are to be taken seriously, then the frequent statement that Congress can
act only on the basis of its enumerated powers should be understood, if not as
an error, then either as an approximation or as a statement that uses the term
“enumerated” in a non-literal way—perhaps as a synonym for “delegated,” rather than a synonym for “articulated expressly.”52 If so, it is more accurate to
say that Congress can act only on the basis of its delegated powers, which is a

47.

Consider, for example, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, id. art. IV, § 1, and the power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, id. amend. XIV, § 5.

48.

See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (“If no
enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be enacted
. . . .”).

49.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (discussing implicit
congressional powers in foreign affairs).

50.

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615-22 (1842) (discussing implicit congressional
power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause).

51.

See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 535 (1870) (“[I]n the judgment of those who
adopted the Constitution, there were powers created by it, neither expressly specified nor
deducible from any one specified power, or ancillary to it alone, but which grew out of the
aggregate of powers conferred upon the government, or out of the sovereignty instituted.”).

52.

See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1127, 1135 (2001) (analyzing the gap between the enumerated powers and the full set of
congressional powers under the Constitution).
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larger set than its enumerated powers.53 Note that the Tenth Amendment speaks
this language: it reserves the “powers not delegated to the United States,” not
the “powers not enumerated.”54
Someone adhering to a stronger form of the enumeration principle—
whether due to a theory of textualism, a commitment to limiting Congress, a
sense of fealty to a traditional maxim of constitutional law, or any combination
of these and other factors—could of course deny that Congress has ever legitimately exercised unenumerated powers. Most simply, all the cases recognizing
such powers might be dismissed as wrongly decided. But it is not necessary to
go that far. The less destabilizing alternative is to argue that the powers the
Court has described as implicit rather than enumerated really are contained
within the enumerated powers, correctly understood.55 For example, the power
to safeguard presidential elections, treated as an implicit congressional power

53.

Even this modification may not capture all of the Court’s analyses. In Curtiss-Wright, for
example, the Court opined that certain powers inherent in sovereignty or nationhood belong to the federal government even independent of the Constitution. 299 U.S. at 315-18; see
also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002) (cataloging powers that the Supreme Court has at various times recognized as belonging to
Congress on the basis of general principles of national sovereignty—rather than on the basis
of any particular provisions of the Constitution).

54.

U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People.”). Close readers of the text have long argued that the wording of the Tenth Amendment
falsifies, rather than confirms, the idea that the Amendment limits the federal government
to those powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and for two reasons. First, the
Tenth Amendment’s reference to “powers not delegated by the Constitution to the United
States” stands in contrast with Article II of the Articles of Confederation, which reserved to
the states every power not “expressly delegated to the United States.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II (emphasis added). The omission of the word “expressly” from the
Tenth Amendment has sometimes been taken to mean that not all of the Constitution’s delegations of power to the federal government are made in express terms. See, e.g., M’Culloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819). Second, a reading proffered long ago by
Christopher Tiedeman argues for the same conclusion by reasoning from the Amendment’s
reference to powers “prohibited to the states.” As Tiedeman explained, the Tenth Amendment specifically recognizes a category of powers—those prohibited to the states—that do
not fall within the category of powers reserved to the states because not delegated to the
United States. Nothing in the Tenth Amendment indicates that powers prohibited to the
states are also prohibited to the United States. Therefore, Tiedeman reasoned, if a power is
prohibited to the states but logically must be a power that can be exercised by someone in
government, it follows that the power in question belongs to the United States, despite its
not having been enumerated. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 137-43 (1890).

55.

See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1098 n.45 (2013).
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in Burroughs v. United States,56 could be reinterpreted as a power necessary and
proper for carrying into execution all of the functions of the President as conferred in Article II and therefore as falling within the power enumerated in the
Necessary and Proper Clause.57 Such an effort, if comprehensive and persuasive, might collapse the distinction between enumerated and delegated powers,
at least in the present, and perhaps also in the future, if that mode of thinking
persisted. It would of course remain the case that, as a historical matter, constitutional decision makers have not categorically limited the powers of Congress
to those that they believed to be enumerated in the Constitution.58 But it is always open to supporters of a strict enumerated-powers doctrine to say that the
Court has sometimes stumbled. Or, more charitably, that the Justices who
purported to recognize unenumerated powers actually builded better than they
knew,59 deciding cases correctly even while not quite articulating the reasons
why. On that interpretation, the enumeration principle is literal and straightforward: Congress simply may not do anything that does not fall within the
powers expressly given to it by the text of the Constitution.

56.

290 U.S. 534, 544-49 (1934).

57.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.”). Note that, if the internal-limits canon is valid, it affects the Necessary and
Proper Clause in the same way that it affects every other power-conferring clause, that is, by
forbidding a construction so broad that the clause (whether alone or in combination with
other powers) gives Congress the equivalent of a police power.

58.

John Mikhail has recently argued in considerable depth that key constitutional drafters,
chiefly James Wilson, intended the Necessary and Proper Clause to indicate that the Constitution delegates more powers to the federal government than it expressly enumerates. See
John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014). In Mikhail’s account, Wilson and others (including some of the Constitution’s leading opponents) understood the Clause’s reference to “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States” to mean not “all powers enumerated in parts of the Constitution
other than Article I, Section 8,” but rather “all powers that this Constitution vests in the
Government of the United States implicitly rather than expressly.” See id. at 1045-57, 112130. But even if modern constitutional interpretation were to be guided by Mikhail’s account,
nothing would necessarily follow about the internal-limits canon. Even if Congress can exercise powers other than those enumerated, it need not follow that Congress’s powers are as
broad in practice as a police power would be.

59.

Cf. Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Problem, in AMERICAN POETRY: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
(John Hollander ed., 1993) (“He builded better than he knew.”).
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B. The Internal-Limits Canon
For present purposes, it does not matter whether “enumeration” should be
understood literally or as a term of art. Either way, the enumeration principle
differentiates the basis for congressional authority from that of the general legislative power that states enjoy.60 Whether or not express enumeration is the
only way in which the Constitution delegates power to Congress, Congress can
only do those things that it is affirmatively authorized to do. And on that theory, Supreme Court Justices standardly reject constructions of congressional
power that seem tantamount to affording Congress plenary legislative authority. To permit constructions that broad would eliminate the role of internal limits as a meaningful part of the system. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in
United States v. Lopez that reading the commerce power to authorize Congress
to regulate the mere possession of firearms would leave the Court “hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate.”61 The same trope featured centrally in the argument over Section
5000A of the Affordable Care Act, commonly called the individual mandate.
According to the joint dissenting opinion in NFIB, upholding the mandate
would “extend federal power to virtually all human activity.”62 And that cannot
60.

I do not mean to say that neither view of the enumeration/delegation issue is more hospitable to the internal-limits canon. A system’s commitment to confining its legislature to a set
of enumerated powers (in the literal sense) could demonstrate a stronger commitment to
the idea of constraining that legislature with internal limits than might be present in a system more willing to let its legislature exercise some unenumerated powers along with its
enumerated ones, in part because the internal limits on a legislature might be thought easier
to identify if all of the legislature’s powers were written in express terms. Conversely, accepting the view that Congress has often exercised unenumerated powers might weaken the
intuition that the Constitution insists unyieldingly on a system of internal limits. It remains
the case, however, that the existence of unenumerated powers need say nothing about
whether the full set of powers is subject to internal limits. And indeed, the Supreme Court
decisions recognizing unenumerated powers have not denied the internal-limits canon.

61.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).

62.

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). An aside: note the use of the word “activity.” The core of
the argument that the commerce power could not authorize the individual mandate was that
the commerce power could regulate activity but not inactivity, and supporters of this perspective pointed out that prior Commerce Clause decisions had used the word “activity” when
describing the reach of that Clause. See, e.g., id. at 2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Against
that argument, one could say that the prior decisions had not intended to use “activity” in a
limiting sense. Instead, phrases like “legislation regulating that activity will be sustained,”
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, or “appellee’s activity . . . may . . . be reached by Congress,” Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942), were intended as the equivalent of “legislation regulating
that subject matter may be sustained” and “this matter may be reached by Congress.” In the
sentence quoted above from the NFIB joint dissent, the phrase “all human activity” can only
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be right, because “the proposition that the Federal Government cannot do everything is a fundamental precept.”63
These opinions articulate the internal-limits canon by insisting that Congress’s powers cannot be construed in a way that would let Congress regulate
without limit. A more careful specification of the idea requires an important
clarification, because neither sustaining the Gun-Free School Zones Act nor
upholding the individual mandate would suggest that there are no limits on
federal power. Even if Congress can require people to buy insurance, it cannot
prohibit Buddhism64 or commandeer state legislatures65 or operate segregated
schools in the District of Columbia.66 The Justices are presumably always
aware of such external limits, even if they sometimes write as if an absence of
meaningful internal limits is the same as the absence of any limits at all.67 To
avoid exaggeration, therefore, the internal-limits canon should be rendered this
way: Congress’s powers cannot be construed in a way that would permit Congress to regulate anything at all unless blocked by an external limit.68
Note too that proponents of the internal-limits canon insist not merely that
individual powers of Congress have internal limits but that the powers of Congress taken as a whole have such limits. Obviously individual powers have internal limits. The power to govern the District of Columbia cannot be used to
govern Delaware, and the power to punish pirates cannot be used to fix the day
on which the Electoral College votes. The issue is whether all the powers collectively face internal limits—that is, whether some potential legislation must
lie beyond any of Congress’s powers, even without considering external limits.
After all, if most of Congress’s powers had internal limits but at least one (say,

be read to mean “all human behavior whether described as activity or inactivity,” because
the point of the sentence is that the individual mandate extends congressional regulation to
something properly described as inactivity. If ever there were a case in which Justices should
have been attentive to distinctions between activity and inactivity, it was NFIB. If even the
joint dissenters in NFIB used the word “activity” to name a category that includes inactivity,
there is little reason to think that prior Justices used the word in a more precise and limiting
way.
63.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).

64.

See U.S. CONST. amend. I.

65.

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

66.

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

67.

See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (declaring that the government’s theory in support
of section 922(q) would make it “difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power”).

68.

This complete formulation makes reference to external limits but not process limits because
external limits are the ones that make it possible to say, “Congress could not enact legislation XYZ.” Process limits are in principle compatible with the enactment of any substantive
legislation.
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the commerce power) had none, then internal limits would not in practice constrain Congress’s ability to legislate: Congress could simply use the commerce
power to do anything that it would be prevented from doing by the internal
limits of other powers. Similarly, even if every individual power of Congress
(including the commerce power) had internal limits, internal limits would not
constrain the total reach of Congress if everything beyond the limits of any given power were within the scope of some other power. Consider, as a simplifying analogy, a legislature with seven enumerated powers, each of which authorized legislation on a different day of the week. Each power would have a
clear internal limit. The Monday power would not authorize legislation on
Tuesday, and so on. But these internal limits would do nothing to constrain
the legislature’s reach, because no matter what the legislature wished to do
(and no matter when), it would have a power adequate for the task. Accordingly, the internal-limits canon is a proposition about the scope of all of Congress’s powers taken as a whole, not a proposition about the limits on those
powers taken separately. It directs that some imaginable laws must lie beyond
Congress’s power, even before considering the constraints imposed by external
limits.
C. The Internal-Limits Canon as Non Sequitur
The enumeration principle is related to the internal-limits canon, and it is
easy to conflate the two ideas. Carefully considered, however, the two are not
the same. And it is a mistake to think that the first requires the second.
The enumeration principle provides a criterion for determining what powers Congress is entitled to exercise. Not to belabor the point, and subject to the
wrinkle about whether “enumerate” means “delegate” or “articulate expressly,”
the principle provides that Congress may exercise only those powers that the
Constitution enumerates. I take that principle to be a valid rule of constitutional interpretation. But without more, the enumeration principle does not address the scope of any particular congressional power, nor does it address the
scope of all those powers combined. As Chief Justice Marshall put the point,
“This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. . . .
But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising . . . .”69
The internal-limits canon is different. It states a rule about the extent of
congressional powers. That rule, as already explained, is that the powers of

69.

M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
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Congress may not be construed in a way that would permit Congress to pass
any and all laws that it could pass if it had a general police power.
The standard wisdom in constitutional law holds that the enumeration
principle implies the internal-limits canon. The powers of Congress are enumerated, the reasoning goes, and although that principle does not precisely define the scope of each power, it does mean that there is an overall limit on their
scope, because there would be no point in enumerating particular powers if in
practice the power of Congress is general.70 That inference might seem plausible, but it is in fact a non sequitur, and it is at that inference that my argument
is aimed.
Congress has only those powers affirmatively given to it by the Constitution. But those particular powers might in practice enable Congress to do all
the things that Congress could do if the Constitution gave Congress a police
power, much as my authorizing my son to eat chocolate, vanilla, or strawberry
ice cream would, under certain circumstances, give him a mandate as broad as
the one he would have if I just authorized him to eat ice cream.71 So yes, the
federal government is a government of enumerated powers. It just may not follow that the set of things Congress can do is thereby narrowed. The burden of
the rest of this Article is to explain why this view is consistent with constitutional structure, history, and text.

70.

Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum that the enumeration presupposes something unenumerated
is commonly taken to state this inference—though, as noted earlier, this standard use of the
Gibbons dictum is a bit of a misreading. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.

71.

As suggested in the Introduction, the two authorizations in practice authorize the same
range of conduct if it turns out that the only flavors of ice cream available at the relevant
time and place are the ones in the specific authorization. And note that it might be perfectly
rational for me to issue the more particular authorization even if, in the circumstances obtaining at a given time, it turned out to have the same impact as the general one. Maybe my
concern is to prevent my son from eating the mint chocolate chip ice cream that I was saving
for myself. Toward that end, I do not authorize him to eat the mint chocolate chip. Unbeknownst to me, though, my wife has already eaten the mint chocolate chip. (Either she did
not know I was saving it or she decided, perhaps correctly, that her claim was greater than
mine.) So when my son opens the freezer, he is as free to choose as if I had given a blanket
authorization. The convergence between the general authorization and the particular one
comes about not because I intended it to but because I lacked perfect information about the
circumstances under which my son would act. And note, too, that nothing about the interest
I intended to protect by giving a more limited authorization is compromised by the fact that
my particularized authorization turns out not to be limiting.
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ii. s t r u c t u r e
The dominant structural rationale for the internal-limits canon sounds in
federalism.72 According to the standard account, internal limits on congressional power are essential in order to preserve the role of state and local government. There is little question about the worthiness of this goal, and the literature on federalism canvasses many reasons why. Local decision making is
often better informed about local problems than federal decision making.73 Depending on one’s conception of democracy, local decision making may also be
more democratic.74 Decision making in smaller polities means more opportunity for individual citizens to experience civic engagement, leadership, and political responsibility.75 Differentiated decision making in different states (and different localities) creates regulatory diversity, and regulatory diversity can
72.

This is not because the enumeration of congressional powers sounds in federalism to the
exclusion of other structural frameworks. The enumeration of congressional powers obviously has implications for the distribution of powers among the federal branches. Nonetheless, the internal-limits canon and the idea of a limiting enumeration are more part of the
rubric of federalism than that of the separation of powers. There are several ways to understand why that is so. For one, the differentiation of function among the federal branches
makes it easy (if sometimes too simple) to understand the limits on Congress vis-à-vis the
other branches in terms of the difference between legislation and other kinds of government
action, rather than between legislation on certain topics and legislation on other topics. As a
result, the idea of a Congress with general legislative power might seem less threatening to a
branch whose job is not legislative at all than to a government also charged with legislating
but whose room to legislate is constrained by the legislation that comes from Congress. Indeed, so strong is the tendency to think of the enumeration in terms of federalism rather
than in terms of the separation of powers that the paradigmatic ways of expressing the
enumeration principle often speak of the federal government as a whole, rather than Congress in particular, as the entity with enumerated powers. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (“The Federal Government ‘is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.’” (quoting M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at
405)); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 159 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“In our system, the Federal Government’s powers are enumerated . . . .”); Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936) (“[T]he powers which the general
government may exercise are only those specifically enumerated in the Constitution
. . . .”); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (“[T]he United States is a government
of limited and enumerated powers . . . .”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat.), 161
(1824) (“[T]he constitution of the United States is one of delegated and enumerated powers
. . . .”).

73.

See Daniel Halberstam, Federalism: A Critical Guide 15-16 (Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 251, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1924939 [http://perma.cc/PPG5-HY9N].

74.

See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389-90 (1997).

75.

See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187 (2005).
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satisfy the preferences of more citizens than uniform regulation can, assuming
that the subject matter is not one that requires wide coordination and assuming
also at least some correlation between the aggregate preferences of different
state populations and the regulatory schemes those states adopt.76 Regulatory
diversity may also provide the laboratories-of-democracy benefit, as the ability
to see different legal rules operate increases the store of knowledge available to
future policymakers.77 For all these reasons, federalism—or more particularly,
the local decision making that is one side of federalism—is valuable.78
A. The Limits of Internal Limits
But are internal limits on the powers of Congress a necessary mechanism—
or even a particularly helpful mechanism—for securing these benefits of federalism in the context of the American constitutional regime? The conventional
answer is yes, and on an apparently straightforward rationale: internal limits
mean less federal law,79 and less federal law means more space for state auton-

76.

The classic account is Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956). For a nice illustration, see Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1494 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)).

77.

See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

78.

Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have famously argued that the benefits discussed here
are more properly thought of as the virtues of decentralization than of federalism. In their
view, real federalism sounds not in consequences for policymaking but in a deontological
right to be different. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). Much of what Rubin and Feeley say about
federalism is valuable, but it is not clear on what basis they justify the choice to limit the
term “federalism” to the particular usage they prefer. For what it is worth, my own sense is
that “federalism” is a reasonable label for a system in which local decision makers are selected by local constituents rather than by the central government and have the authority to
raise and spend revenue independently of that central government. In any event, nothing
important for the present analysis turns on the choice between these two labels. Internal
limits are conventionally promoted in the name of something that constitutional discourse
standardly calls “federalism,” and I am showing why arguments based on that thing do not
supply a good reason for insisting on internal limits. If it were true that the thing here called
“federalism” should be called “decentralization,” nothing about my argument would need to
change other than the term.

79.

A consequentialist analysis of internal limits would need to weigh the costs of disallowing
federal laws that might have some social benefit in their own right. Perhaps an ideal form of
internal limits would eliminate this concern: in keeping with a theory usually known as
“subsidiarity,” some theorists have proposed that the limit on Congress’s enumerated powers should be the principle that the federal government may legislate only in cases where
there is a reason for regulation to be undertaken centrally rather than left to more local authorities. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 8, at 555. But as at least some leading proponents of this
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omy. It is a powerful idea, at least on the surface, in part because it seems like
simple common sense. But the dynamics of modern federalism are more complicated than the conventional answer assumes. For one thing, the allocation of
decision making among federal and state authorities is not always a zero-sum
game. Sometimes federal regulation displaces local regulation, but sometimes
federal law empowers state policymakers more than it constrains them.80 At
least as importantly, internal limits might have little practical capacity to reduce
the amount of federal law. This is so both because Congress can usually work
around internal limits and because the conditions of modern regulation often
mean that the elimination of one federal law leaves a subject matter regulated
by some other federal law, rather than making the subject matter free from federal regulation entirely.
Some of these dynamics can be illustrated by reference to the most prominent internal limits articulated in recent case law: the economic-noneconomic
limit on the commerce power that the Court imposed in Lopez and the actioninaction limit that five Justices endorsed in NFIB. Each of these limits makes it
possible to describe laws that Congress’s commerce power would not authorize, and the Justices keenest on enforcing internal limits in Lopez and NFIB described these limits as required by the internal-limits canon. But neither limit
cultivates the substantive virtues of vesting decision-making power in states
rather than in the federal government all that well, because neither limit creates
a significant policymaking space in which states can operate free from federal
interference. Indeed, these limits did not even prevent the implementation of
the substance of the federal regulations to which they were applied. After Lopez
held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act could not be sustained as a law regulating an economic activity with substantial effects on interstate commerce,81
Congress reenacted the substance of the Act as a regulation of instrumentalities—here, firearms—that move in interstate commerce,82 and the courts have
uniformly upheld the reenacted version.83 In NFIB, a majority of the Justices
took the position that the individual mandate is not a valid exercise of the
view acknowledge, it may not be simple or even possible to translate this principle into rules
that courts are institutionally well suited to enforce. See id. at 559; see also Kramer, supra note
21, at 1499-1501 (noting that which policies are best made centrally and which locally change
as conditions change, and doubting that courts have the capacity to keep up).
80.

See infra Part II.B. This phenomenon is a variety of the more general phenomenon by which
law sometimes empowers rather than limits the subjects to whom it applies. See, e.g., HART,
supra note 44, at 27-28.

81.

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).

82.

See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2012).

83.

See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1999).
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commerce power,84 but a different majority upheld the mandate as a valid exercise of the taxing power.85 Indeed, even the Justices who concluded that the
mandate was not a valid exercise of the taxing power agreed that Congress
could enact the substance of the mandate using its taxing power; their contention was only that Congress had not actually done it that way.86 If the internal
limits announced in Lopez and NFIB cannot even prevent the implementation
of the substantive regulations at issue in those two cases, it seems unlikely that
they can clear away or forestall any great amount of federal law.87

84.

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012); id. at 2647
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).

85.

See id. at 2600 (majority opinion); id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring
in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).

86.

See id. at 2651, 2655 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).

87.

NFIB did meaningfully limit the power of Congress on a different front—conditional
spending—by holding that Congress could not require states to choose between participating in a substantial expansion of Medicaid and withdrawing from Medicaid entirely. See id.
at 2604-07 (holding that Congress may not use the threat of withdrawing funding from a
large existing program as a means of getting states to agree to participate in a different, albeit related, program); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the
Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013) (formulating this holding). This holding can be understood either as the imposition of an evadable internal limit on the model of
Lopez or as sounding in external limits rather than internal ones. If the rule that Congress
may not “leverage” existing spending to coerce states to undertake new programs is an internal limit on the spending power, it is one that Congress could in principle work around
by using the spending power differently, just as Congress worked around Lopez by using the
commerce power differently. For example, Congress could repeal Medicaid entirely and
then enact a formally new program (“Shmedicaid”) whose content would fully reproduce
that of Medicaid and also include the ACA’s proposed expansion. Or Congress could enact
the new portion of Medicaid as an entirely federal program, without state participation.
Neither of these alternatives seems particularly realistic today, but the reasons lie in the political process rather than in internal limits on the spending power. Alternatively, the
Court’s rationale on this subject could be understood as sounding in external limits. According to Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for three Justices, and also according to the four joint
dissenters (not dissenting on this point), the conditional spending provisions of the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion were tantamount to Congress’s compelling the states to participate in
that expansion, and Congress may not compel states to enact or administer particular regulatory programs. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603-05. That prohibition is the same one animating the anticommandeering rule of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), and the rationales given in NFIB echoed and cited
those cases. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602-03. In short, NFIB’s striking down this aspect
of the Medicaid expansion might be best understood, in substance, as an application of the
anticommandeering principle in the context of federal spending, with the necessary variation that in NFIB the states had a formal choice about whether to participate, and the Court
found that formalism to be devoid of substance and accordingly insufficient to defeat the
general principle. Understood this way, the Medicaid holding in NFIB rests on an external
limit, because the principle that Congress may not compel the states to regulate is not par-
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The unreliability of internal limits as tools for increasing the available space
for autonomous state decision making results partly from the mismatch between a formal set of limitations on Congress and the internal-limits canon’s
goal of creating substantive areas of policymaking into which Congress cannot
intrude. As is typical of formal rules, these internal limits can be evaded by recourse to other formal rules, and, in this area, the evasions enable Congress to
reach its intended regulatory targets by formally different routes. The problem
runs deep: as Justice Ginsburg suggested in NFIB, even if the action-inaction
distinction could prevent Congress from passing a law compelling Americans
to eat broccoli, Congress could create the same substantive regime by prohibiting the purchase or consumption of any food other than broccoli, except by
persons who had already eaten their broccoli.88
This is not to say that internal limits are completely incapable of preventing
federal regulation. Sometimes workarounds are costly. A given Congress might
be willing to enact the individual mandate but not to create a single-payer system. In such a case, an internal limit blocking the individual mandate might
result in a meaningful regulatory difference. Congress would still be authorized
to enact sweeping healthcare reform, but it might choose not to, assuming that
it could not identify some other workaround less costly than the single-payer
approach. Moreover, if an enacting Congress does not foresee that its statute
might be invalidated on the basis of an internal limit, the choice of whether to
enact a workaround will probably lie with a different Congress that might not
be as invested in the substance of the legislation. Congress did not reinstate the
civil remedy of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) after the Court
struck it down in United States v. Morrison,89 even though the move that
ticular to the Spending Clause. It rests on a principle of federalism that transcends any specific enumerated power and blocks otherwise valid uses of any of the powers listed in Article
I.
88.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part). Either such law might face challenges under the Due Process
Clause, but those challenges would traffic in external rather than internal limits.

89.

529 U.S. 598 (2000). Morrison’s holding on the scope of Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment is of little moment here. By holding that Congress may not use Section Five to
reach a private actor, id. at 621-27, the Court did impose an internal limit on one of Congress’s enumerated powers. But as noted earlier, it is no part of the present argument to deny that the enumerated powers have internal limits when taken individually. Of course they
do. The power to declare war cannot be used to coin money, and the power to coin money
cannot be used to define and punish piracies. My argument here is that the various internal
limits on congressional powers may not actually limit what Congress can do, because in situations where an internal limit prevents a given power of Congress from authorizing some
desired statute, Congress may have a different power that can get the job done. Morrison’s
treatment of Section Five is consistent with that possibility. Unlike in cases like Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), and Kimel v. Florida Board
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worked after Lopez was available there as well, at least in substantial part. Imagine a federal statute creating a civil remedy for crimes of gender-motivated
violence committed with an instrumentality of interstate commerce. The fact
that Congress did not pass such a statute may reflect mostly the differing policy
preferences of Congress and the President in 1994, when VAWA was passed,
and in 2001, after Morrison was decided.
If the aftermath of every invalidation of a federal statute on internal-limits
grounds followed Lopez’s script rather than Morrison’s, there would be less
need to recognize the flaws in the internal-limits canon. Congressional workarounds reinstating the substance of the initial law would consume time and effort, but the end-state regulatory environment would be unaffected. But reinstatements by workaround are not automatic, as the Morrison example
illustrates. Yes, Congress can legislate more or less as it thinks best, subject to
external limits, but only if its policy preferences remain constant from the time
of a statute’s initial passage to the time of the workaround, and only if Congress is willing to legislate twice.
Viewed sympathetically, this dynamic might transform internal limits into
a species of process limit, one that permits Congress to pursue its chosen program so long as it makes the heightened effort required to do so. If properly
tailored to protect the interests of federalism, internal limits might have some
value as process limits, albeit by becoming something rather different from
what constitutional lawyers have traditionally taken internal limits to be. But
given the frequency with which Congress could design workarounds in cases
where it knew ex ante how internal-limit rules would apply, the heightened
process requirements might come mostly as a matter of ex post surprise. Had
the 1994 Congress known that Lopez was coming, it might have enacted VAWA with some appropriate workaround. Similarly, although Congress in 2009
and 2010 preferred mandates to a single-payer health insurance system, Congress would likely have been pushed toward some solution that did not risk invalidation on action-inaction grounds—whether single-payer or something
else—if the action-inaction distinction had been a clear part of commerce doctrine prior to the passage of the ACA. As a result, any limiting effects of internal limits might have a somewhat arbitrary shape, tracking accidents of timing
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), the Section Five issue in Morrison was about Congress’s ability to regulate private actors, not its ability to overcome the sovereign immunity of state officials. On the understanding that with respect to private actors Congress could use a Lopezlike workaround to impose the civil remedy at issue in Morrison under the commerce power,
that case’s view of Section Five does not limit Congress’s overall regulatory jurisdiction.
Note, too, that the limit on Congress’s ability to bind state officials that Section Five cases
like Garrett and Kimel represent is an external limit on Congress, not an internal one. Its
source is the Eleventh Amendment.
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more than any consistent logic about what policies should be made locally rather than centrally. Perhaps such limits could create a hodgepodge of disallowed federal statutes, or applications of federal statutes,90 and perhaps the
regulatory space opened thereby would add a bit to the sum total of regulatory
space available for state policymaking. But it seems doubtful that that additional space would be large or well targeted enough to add meaningfully to the
robust, extensive practice of state and local decision making that exists today
under a regime in which internal limits play almost no role.
These explanations of why internal limits might not fulfill the promise of
enhancing federalism are partly a function of currently prevailing conditions
and attitudes about federal legislation. In other words, the fact that internal
limits are today poor tools for ensuring substantive areas of state policymaking
might not mean that such rules could never be useful for that purpose. Once
upon a time, a set of internal limits seemed to protect substantial state policymaking space. Consider the famous distinction between direct and indirect effects in commerce doctrine.91 As every law student learns, that distinction eventually came to seem absurd, and the boundary it policed disintegrated.92 But at
an earlier time, that distinction and others like it seemed to work pretty well as
frameworks for circumscribing the reach of federal power. Why could such
formalisms succeed at some times and not at others? Three reasons—or perhaps three faces of the same reason—supply much of the answer.
First, as Lawrence Lessig has observed, these doctrines worked when they
did, not simply because earlier judges were more sympathetic to metaphysical
distinctions like the one between direct and indirect effects (though that may to
some extent have been the case) but also because those judges as a group had a
widely shared sense of how to distinguish between federal and state spheres of
regulation.93 When judges implemented doctrines like the direct-indirect distinction in light of that shared sense, they reached a more or less stable set of
results. Second, the sense of federalism that Lessig identifies as widely shared
among judges of a certain era was also shared by many legislators, such that
Congress was simply less inclined to regulate pervasively than it was later on.

90.

By requiring Congress to reenact the Gun-Free School Zones Act as a regulation of firearms
that have moved in interstate commerce, Lopez prevented the application of the regulations
at issue in cases where the firearms in question have not moved in interstate commerce. Given the interstate market in guns, that would be a small subset of all the cases that the original statute would have covered. But it is more than nothing.

91.

See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935).

92.

Cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937) (rejecting the direct-indirect
distinction as a basis for limiting the commerce power).

93.

Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 161.
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Congressional restraint meant that autonomous spheres of state regulation
were a normal part of the landscape and that any judicially imposed limits on
Congress reinforced that reality. (In a sparsely regulated world, the invalidation of a single law might leave the relevant subject matter unregulated. In today’s densely regulated world, the invalidation of a single law is more likely to
mean that some other law becomes the operative regulation.) Third, Congress’s disinclination to regulate pervasively meant that the judiciary could police the federal-state balance without constant conflict with the elected branches. Persistent conflict sometimes sharpens the questions at issue, and in the
absence of constant conflict judges were perhaps more able to get by with a
shared-sense jurisprudence than they would have been in the face of pressure
to articulate clear rules about what was and was not permissible.
These conditions did not last forever. Eventually, and partly due to the logic of living in an increasingly interconnected world, more and more members
of the decision-making class came to question prevailing intuitions about the
exceptional nature of federal governance. The Sixteenth Amendment signaled
an appetite for a larger federal regulatory agenda and supplied the means for
carrying one out.94 Congress became more willing to legislate and to legislate
pervasively. In the judiciary, the erosion of an intuitive consensus about the
limits of federal power meant that doctrinal distinctions like the one between
direct and indirect effects could no longer maintain the old limits. Absent
shared substantive understandings, the doctrinal formulas came to seem amorphous, arbitrary, or both. And the separate-spheres vision famously known as
“dual federalism”95 gave way to other conceptions (marble-cake federalism,96
picket-fence federalism97) built on the recognition that modern federalism involves two sets of officials working on common subject matter, rather than two
sets of officials operating in different policy domains.
Even in the era of dual federalism, though, internal limits never did the
work of delineating separate spheres all by themselves. Instead, internal limits
were supplemented as needed by a judicial willingness to declare forthrightly

94.

See Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and
the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1736-37 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT F.
NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989)) (describing the role of the Sixteenth Amendment in this process).

95.

Corwin, supra note 34, at 4 (offering the seminal description of “dual federalism”).

96.

See MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW
UNITED STATES 8 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966).

97.

See TERRY SANFORD, STORM OVER THE STATES 80 (1967) (imagining federal and state governments as the horizontal posts of a picket fence and federal, state, and local programs as
the vertical posts connecting them).

602

OF

GOVERNMENT

IN THE

the limits of enumeration

that certain spheres of substantive regulation were reserved to the states. For
example, when the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler struck down a federal subsidy provided under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the majority
opinion discussed the question presented as a matter of the extent of Congress’s spending power, but then at a critical moment declared that the dispositive consideration was not to be found in the best construction of the Spending
Clause. Instead, the subsidy program was unconstitutional because it invaded a
reserved right of the states, namely the right to control agricultural production.98 Similarly, the Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart struck down the Child Labor Act’s rules prohibiting certain interstate shipments of goods produced with
child labor not because prohibiting interstate shipments was not within the
commerce power—the Court conceded that the transportation of property was
as much commerce as purchase and sale—but because this restriction on interstate shipping would impinge on the inherently local matter of manufacturing.99 In these cases, the Court discussed the scope of Congress’s spending and
commerce powers, but the considerations that invalidated the laws at issue
were not conceptual accounts of “spending” and “commerce.” They were accounts of what regulatory subject matters must be reserved to the states. If the
question is what sort of judicial doctrine would help protect local decision
making, that reserved-sphere approach makes a good deal of sense: a robust
doctrine of reserved subject matters can limit congressional authority in ways
that preserve meaningful and independent policymaking spaces for state governments. But that solution cannot vindicate the idea that there must be internal limits on Congress’s enumerated powers, because it is a solution based on
external limits rather than internal ones. Just like the Free Exercise Clause, a
rule that Congress may not regulate agriculture or manufacturing cross-cuts
the enumerated powers, blocking congressional action on the basis of a constitutional concept arising somewhere outside the delegation of powers to Congress.
To be sure, one could try to present reserved-sphere rules as internal limits
by reading them into the interpretation of particular congressional powers.
One could say, for example, that the commerce power does not authorize Congress to regulate agriculture because “commerce” and “agriculture” are two different things. But unless one also ensured that Congress’s other powers could

98.

See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (describing the regulation of agriculture as
lying within “the reserved rights of the states”).

99.

See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (reserving regulation of “the production
of articles,” as opposed to their interstate transportation, to states, and holding such production immune from the effect of a regulation that formally regulated interstate transportation).
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not be used to regulate “agriculture,” this limitation on the commerce power
would not prevent Congress from regulating in that area with some other tool.
And if one purported to read the same internal limit into every one of the enumerated powers—if one maintained, in other words, that the proper interpretation of every power granted to Congress anywhere in the Constitution happened to exclude any power to make regulations affecting agriculture—then
observers might wonder whether the real operating force was an external limit
prohibiting Congress from regulating agriculture, rather than a remarkable
confluence of many different internal limits.
In principle, either answer is possible. Maybe the work is really being done
by an external limit, or maybe there are simply spheres of social life that lie beyond the internal limits of all of Congress’s powers. The latter possibility is, of
course, the one that the internal-limits canon insists upon. But in deciding
which possibility is more likely, it is worth noticing that at least some of the
Court’s key decisions purporting to enforce internal limits referred to externallimit considerations at analytically critical junctures and that the reasoning of
those cases is more easily comprehensible if we take external limits to be doing
work. If the Court cannot explain why a spending program is unconstitutional
without invoking the states’ reserved control over agriculture, and if the Court
cannot explain why a law formally regulating the interstate shipment of commercial goods is unconstitutional without invoking the inherent right of states
to control manufacturing, then internal limits are not the sole motive force of
those decisions. Even before the New Deal, external limits did much of the
work.100
B. Federalism Without Internal Limits
Nothing in this analysis suggests the demise of federalism. State governments today exercise considerable sway over a broad swath of important policymaking domains. Differentiated state decision making is more than robust
enough to deliver substantial regulatory diversity, not to mention immensely
greater opportunities for civic engagement and political leadership than would
be possible if American political decision making were fully centralized. So the
inability of internal limits to protect enough autonomous state policymaking to
make federalism worthwhile has not nullified those virtues of federalism. State
decision making is simply perpetuated by other mechanisms.

100.
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A few of these mechanisms are external limits on Congress’s powers. Perhaps most fundamentally, Congress may not unilaterally terminate101 or reconfigure102 existing states. Congress may not dictate the location of a state capital103 or tax a state’s own tax revenue.104 State sovereign immunity doctrines are
external limits, albeit defeasible through the exercise of congressional powers
rooted in constitutional provisions postdating the Eleventh Amendment.105
The anticommandeering rules are external limits that help states engage in policymaking by limiting the federal government’s ability to force the hands of
state decision makers.106
Obviously, these limits are useful only if there are substantive areas in
which states can make policy, and other mechanisms help to ensure that such
areas exist. Some of these mechanisms are process limits, albeit not quite the
set of process limits that the Founders imagined. Many of those limits never
worked the way the Founders imagined they would,107 and others have been
repudiated by constitutional amendment108 or undermined by changing practices and attitudes over time.109 Nonetheless, process limits remain important
aspects of American governance, in ways that include both formal and informal
interactions between federal decision makers and their state counterparts. For a
variety of reasons that prior scholarship has canvassed, state and local officials
have substantial influence in the shaping of federal law and federal regulations,
and they regularly deploy that influence to prevent federal authority from unduly contravening local interests or sidelining state decision makers.110 One

101.

Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868) (describing an “indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible states”).

102.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.

103.

Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).

104.

New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).

105.

See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that state sovereign immunity is
limited by the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment).

106.

See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

107.

Accord Kramer, supra note 21, at 1490-91.

108.

For example, the Seventeenth Amendment converted the Senate from an assembly of agents
of state governments into an assembly of popular representatives (though it may be more
accurate to say that it mostly ratified a conversion that had already taken place in practice,
because for most of the nineteenth century state legislatures tended to elect to the Senate
people who had campaigned successfully for the office among the general public). See William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 452, 463-64 (1955).

109.

Again, the changing status of the Senate is a good example, for reasons given supra note 108.

110.

See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256 (2009); Kramer, supra note 21, at 1543-46. One can carve the terrain of process limits,
political safeguards, and administrative safeguards in various ways. For example, Kramer
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should not romanticize or overstate these mechanisms.111 The idea that political-process mechanisms will always do right by the interests of federalism
would be a just-so story, as would the idea that the political process always
does right by any other kind of interest. But one need not subscribe to the idea
that process federalism cures all ills to recognize that it has some important effects.
A second set of mechanisms—perhaps overlapping with the first112—falls
within the rubric known as “cooperative federalism.”113 It is a normal feature of
modern American governance that Congress works with states, rather than
around them, when engaging in important regulatory projects. Federal statutory schemes addressing social security,114 the environment,115 health care,116 education,117 transportation,118 crime control,119 and many other topics rely on the
states as powerful players in deciding what will actually happen and who will

describes the administrative dynamics at issue here as a form of political safeguard, but
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken prefer to think of “administrative safeguards of federalism” as
falling within a different category. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra, at 1285 n.103, 1292
(analyzing and critiquing Kramer’s approach). But the question of how best to organize
these phenomena into a taxonomy is not really important (and I do not read any of the
writers just mentioned to think otherwise).
111.

See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 582 (2012)
(pointing out that federal agencies are sometimes criticized for failing to consult state officials even when officially required to do so).

112.

Cooperative federalism might be a species of process federalism, or it might be a separate
phenomenon, or the two phenomena might overlap, depending on how one draws the
boundaries of each concept. For present purposes, it is not important to decide which set of
constructions is best. What matters is that the mechanisms that go by these names collectively do a great deal to ensure ongoing meaningful decision-making roles for state and local
officials.

113.

“Cooperative federalism” is better understood as an umbrella term naming several varying
arrangements rather than a single precise model of federal-state cooperation. See Abbe R.
Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal
Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 584-88 (2011) (describing several arrangements that could plausibly be described as versions of cooperative federalism).

114.

See, e.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (2012).

115.

See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b), (d), (e)(2) (2012).

116.

See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18002(e)(3), 18003(a)(1)
(2012).

117.

See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6304, 6311 (2012).

118.

See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 148 (2012).

119.

See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14163 (2012).
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get what.120 The Affordable Care Act provides a prominent contemporary example. Congress made the American Health Benefit Exchanges state-based institutions, which means that state officials can decide how to implement the
certification criteria that will determine what plans are finally offered to the
public in their states.121 Some members of Congress believed that the policy of
the ACA would be best carried out by a national health insurance exchange, but
others took it as a matter of critical importance that the exchange be put in
state hands, and the latter view prevailed.122 The ACA also dramatically expanded Medicaid, and state bureaucracies are the ones with the expertise, local
knowledge, and boots on the ground that are needed to make the envisioned
expansion real. To be sure, many states have to date declined to participate in
these ventures,123 and that development has thrown a fair amount of decision
making back to the federal government. For present purposes, though, what
matters is precisely how unusual (and indeed unanticipated) it is for states to
opt out on this scale. The ACA is a limiting case, involving the greatest policy
conflict in decades. Normal federal governance involves a high degree of state
involvement as a matter of routine, as noted above with respect to policy areas
from crime control to highway management to the environment and social security.
The normal pattern is neither an accident nor a matter of congressional
grace. It is a structural aspect of modern American government, one that has
emerged in light of considerations about the capabilities of states and the limitations—practical, rather than legal—of Congress.124 More than twenty percent
of all “federal” nondefense spending for 2011 was spent by state and local governments administering cooperative federalism programs.125 Implementation of

120.

See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the
Old-fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749 (2013) (surveying the pervasive
role of state decision making and state implementation within federal statutory schemes).

121.

See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 575-79 (2011).

122.

See Gluck, supra note 113, at 578.

123.

See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2014), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around
-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act [http://perma.cc/8TQY-DBWW] (listing the states that had opted to participate as of August 28, 2014, and those which had not).

124.

See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 868-70 (1998) (describing the practical limits on federal capacity that prevent federalization of policy areas at
will).

125.

See Historical Budget Data—May 2013, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (May 14, 2013), http://
www.cbo.gov/publication/44197 [http://perma.cc/CDZ7-TH5Y] (demonstrating a total of
$2.899 trillion in total nondefense spending in 2011, calculated by adding mandatory outlays
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the ACA is driving the figure higher. Even if Congress wanted to, the federal
government could not tomorrow (or next year, or in five years) displace the
states from their roles in governance under this system, in part because it could
not simply summon into existence the personnel and institutional capacity that
would be necessary for doing so. To return again to the ACA example, the
threat that state opt-out has posed to the successful implementation of the Act
is predicated on the reality that Congress needs the states to make things happen.
Given that reality, state governments have considerable latitude to make
decisions about the public policies that federal statutory schemes represent.
Cooperative federalism is cooperative (or uncooperative)126 rather than dictatorial: the states are not neutral conveyor belts for the implementation of federal programs. State and local officials negotiate, bargain, modify, and sometimes undermine federal policy, and their opportunity to do all of those things
yields the range of benefits that makes federalism valuable in the first place: local knowledge brought to bear on local questions, local responsibility for those
decisions, regulatory diversity, broadened opportunities for civic engagement
and political leadership, and so on.127 State officials’ choices within these
schemes are constrained by boundaries set at the national level, but that is true
of any system of state autonomy that respects the principle of federal supremacy—or even just constitutional supremacy.
The pertinent question is whether the policymaking discretion that state
and local officials exercise is consequential enough to make those officials
meaningful decision makers rather than ministerial instruction-takers, and of
that there can be little doubt. Recall that many state officials wanted responsibility for the healthcare exchanges, because they understood the enormous
power that responsibility confers. As many have noticed, states that want to
impede the federal policy embodied in the Affordable Care Act have had ample
opportunity to do so. Note, too, by way of general analogy, that local decision
makers are often consequential even though most localities formally have no

and net interest from Table 3, to discretionary nondefense outlays from Table 4); Federal
Grants to State and Local Governments, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE 1, 3, 7 (Mar. 2013), http://www
.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43967_FederalGrants.pdf [http://perma.cc
/X2XK-GDG3] (showing a total of $607 billion in federal grants to state and local governments in fiscal year 2011).
126.

See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 110 (describing instances in which states
used regulatory power provided to them by the federal government to oppose federal policy).

127.

See id. at 1284-94 (outlining the advantages of uncooperative federalism). Uncooperative
federalism also sometimes wastes resources and blunts the effectiveness of salutary public
policy initiatives. Id. at 1287.
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existence or power whatsoever except that which the state chooses to grant.128
If even the fully hierarchical relationship of states and cities does not preclude
local governments from delivering many of the benefits of federalism—local
knowledge, local accountability, preference matching, opportunities for civic
engagement and political leadership—then it should be clear that state (and local) governments can deliver many of these benefits even when working in environments structured by federal legislation. States are, after all, much more
independent of the federal government, even in an era of active federal regulation, than localities are of states.
Despite the thick reality and enormous importance of cooperative federalism, constitutional lawyers sometimes suspect that whatever “federalism” is involved in these schemes is not real federalism in the constitutional sense.129 Real federalism, the intuition runs, does not reside in complex regulatory systems
that are, at bottom, creations of Congress. On this view, the federalism that the
Constitution ordains requires a more thorough separation between that which
is national and that which is local130—a separation more consistent with the
values of early Americans who distrusted central authority.131 And that separation, the Supreme Court has explained, stands or falls with the internal-limits
canon.132 As Abbe Gluck has put the point, though, the idea that that kind of
separation can deliver the benefits of federalism “depends on what no longer
exists,” namely “significant areas of regulation that are reserved to the states
and into which federal lawmaking may not tread.”133 In a world where dual
federalism is gone and federal regulation is pervasive, disallowing this or that
law as beyond Congress’s powers will never recreate the kind of separation that

128.

See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 111-12 (1990).

129.

Cf. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013) (describing the question of the validity of a federal agency’s construction of a statute specifying state obligations within such a
system as one of “faux-federalism”).

130.

See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (“The Constitution requires
a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580-81 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The central
issue of federalism, of course, is . . . whether any area remains in which a State may act free
of federal interference.”).

131.

See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (citing
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison)).

132.

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (stating that upholding the GunFree School Zones Act “would require us to conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of
powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local” (citation omitted)).

133.

Gluck, supra note 120, at 1751.
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once made it sensible to think of state policymaking as thoroughly independent
of Congress, rather than as constantly interacting with federal governance.
The older vision of separate-sphere federalism has a strong hold on American imaginations. Its simplicity and historical resonance make it appealing, especially when contrasted with the bureaucratic technicality that cooperative
federalism embodies.134 Fundamental constitutional intuitions are usually conceptions that well-socialized Americans appreciate without specialized professional training. We learn them as part of our civic education long before we arrive at law school. So it is a great disadvantage of cooperative federalism that
even the most creative Schoolhouse Rock writer would find it a challenging concept to convey. Depicting the mechanisms of cooperative federalism can require multi-page interlocking organizational charts, and the romantic nationalidentity aspects of federalism tend not to resonate in discussions about, say, the
criteria for federal funding of state-initiated roadside lighting projects.135 But if
the question is how American governance actually works—a question that
should concern practical people, and a question that courts should keep in
mind when exercising their considerable disruptive power—then cooperative
federalism is a central part of the answer. It is what the bulk of federalism looks
like in the modern Republic, and it provides many of the benefits that make
federalism valuable.
No one should think that cooperative federalism provides those benefits in
exactly the optimal ways or in exactly the optimal quantities. Neither cooperative federalism nor process federalism nor any other kind of federalism—
including a federalism based on internal limits—could be expected to produce
that outcome. But process federalism and cooperative federalism yield the benefits that make federalism valuable more robustly than any system of internal
limits has in a long time, if indeed a system of internal limits ever yielded those
benefits without the support of an underlying theory of separate spheres that
courts were willing to enforce through external limits on federal power.
134.

In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), the Court confronted a question
about the scope of a federal agency’s authority to prescribe the obligations of state agencies
under a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Two Justices saw this issue as
raising questions of federalism. See id. at 402-12 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 412-31 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But given
that the issue was both highly technical and one arising within what is ultimately a statutory
scheme set and variable by Congress, the Court was probably not wrong to remark that “it is
hard to spark a passionate ‘States’ rights’ debate” on the matter. Id. at 379 n.6 (majority
opinion). What the remark reveals, of course, is an intuition that constitutional federalism
should be the sort of thing that riles people up, not the sort of thing that resides in technocratic detail.

135.

See 23 U.S.C. § 148(c) (2012) (establishing eligibility criteria for federal funding for roadside
lighting projects); id. § 148(h) (describing reporting requirements).
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C. Attitudinal Formation and the Internal-Limits Canon
There remains at least one more concern about the damage that discarding
the internal-limits canon might do to federalism. Part of what maintains the
federalist dynamics of interaction between state and federal officials is a set of
ideas about what each government is supposed to do. Process federalism and
cooperative federalism are maintained partly by practical conditions and partly
by a set of attitudes, and the two are mutually reinforcing. In other words,
these mechanisms persist in part because the players who deliberate and
negotiate and decide are inclined to consider local decision making valuable. To
be sure, people’s ideas about which government should do what are far from
uniform, and there is constant renegotiation of certain boundaries, as there is
in most complex relationships. The system could not possibly rely on
everyone’s sharing precisely, or even close to precisely, the same set of views
about the proper roles of state and federal government. Still, a certain amount
of shared sense among officials and the public to which they respond is an
important element of the system, and a wholesale shift in attitudes might cause
existing dynamics to unravel. Not quickly: the limits on federal power are
rooted in practical considerations as well as attitudinal ones, so it would take a
fair amount of institutional reconfiguration to overcome those limits even if
federal officials wanted to do so. Indeed, the difficulty of the project is probably
one important force in deterring any such ambition. But in principle, and over
time, a broad and deep shift in attitudes could facilitate large changes in
constitutional dynamics.
Might official stories like the one embodied in the internal-limits canon
play a role in preventing such an evolution? We form our constitutional expectations in part by hearing how the system is described.136 An articulated principle under which the powers of Congress are inherently limiting might teach
Americans—including both officeholders and at least some of the civically literate citizens to whom they respond—to think twice about whether a given
project is appropriate for the exercise of central power. If the internal-limits
canon were repudiated, one of the influences supporting that consciousness
would disappear. And that, one might worry, could lead to the disintegration
of what is now a relatively healthy federal system.
One can only speculate as to the gravity of this concern. I expect that different people will have different intuitions, just as people through the centuries
have had different intuitions about whether preserving social order and inter136.

See generally Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 MICH. L. REV. 91 (2010) (describing the formation and power of citizens’ expectations about how the constitutional system is supposed to function).

611

the yale law journal

124:576

2014

personal decency requires public affirmation of orthodox religious beliefs,
whether metaphysically sound or otherwise. The internal-limits canon is salient within official ideas about federalism, but that does not tell us how much
weight it bears in the attitudinal architecture. Maybe it is important. But maybe it is marginal, or even superfluous. Many other influences also contribute to
the attitudes necessary for maintaining a limited federal government, some
conceptual and some practical. To take just one set of examples, consider the
many canons of federal statutory interpretation that embody and reinforce the
idea that federal governance should not impinge too much on state governance.
Absent clear statements to the contrary, federal statutes are not to be read to
intrude on traditional state criminal jurisdiction, or to abrogate state sovereign
immunity, or to preempt state law, or, speaking more generally, to alter an existing balance between federal and state power.137 Would the loss of the internal-limits canon provoke the loss of these other canons as well, or would these
other canons and a host of other forces go on teaching the basic lesson even
without being supplemented by the particular practice of speaking (emptily)
about internal limits? And if we were to try to figure out how removing this
particular piece of the discourse might shift attitudes, we should not exclude
the possibility that the internal-limits canon might undermine as well as enhance the idea that the federal government has a limited regulatory role. Everyone who knows the internal-limits canon also knows that in practice the federal government has long seemed to enjoy the equivalent of general legislative
power, or very nearly so. Might the takeaway message for at least some audiences be that core tenets of federalism are quaint fables that practical people
should not take seriously? Or more broadly, that constitutional law is an enterprise in which we say one thing and do another? If so, might these attitudes be
at least as damaging as letting go of the internal-limits canon would be?
There is no way to measure the net discursive effect of the internal-limits
canon on the self-limiting tendencies of federal officials. But in the absence of
knowledge, there are reasons for skepticism about how much attitudinal damage would result if the canon were abandoned. Maybe the formula’s very familiarity leads us to overestimate not just its cogency but also its importance as an
attitudinal prompt. Given that uncertainty, it seems prudent to avoid making
this concern into too strong a reason for holding on to the canon, especially at a
time when taking the canon seriously might cause important distortions in
constitutional decision making.
***

137.
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The practical value of the internal-limits canon is supposed to be its capacity to limit central governance in a way that fosters the benefits of federalism.
But we should not be confident that it is actually a useful means to that end.
Internal limits might not be able to do very much either to limit the federal
government or to enhance meaningful state decision making. It is therefore
fortunate that the constitutional system contains other kinds of limits. Indeed,
the system contains many of those limits precisely because the Founders collectively foresaw that internal limits might not get the job done. They insisted on
alternatives.
iii. h is t o r y
Constitutional history is much broader than the history of the Founding
period, and normative constitutional practice often appears different when
viewed through the lens of one period in history rather than another. One way
to understand the argument against the internal-limits canon is as an argument
that takes the most recent century of constitutional law as a source of authoritative practices.138 That said, it is a fact about American constitutional thought
that the Founding period occupies a privileged position among historical eras.
And it is in the Founding that the historical argument in favor of the internallimits canon is firmly grounded. According to that argument, internal limits
were a critical part of the Founding design, and fidelity to that design requires
the continued operation of internal limits as meaningful constraints on Congress.
There is no serious doubt that most of the Founders expected internal limits on congressional powers to constrain the federal government.139 But conventional wisdom about internal limits in the Founding design makes at least
two important errors. The first, addressed in Part III.A, concerns the importance of internal limits relative to other kinds of limits in constraining the
federal government. Following an argument famously advanced by Hamilton
and others at the time of ratification, many leading figures have noted that the
original Constitution contained an enumeration of congressional powers but
no Bill of Rights and reasoned that the Founding generation saw the enumera-

138.

This is not to say that the most recent century, if taken as authoritative, would support any
position on this issue univocally. Centuries rarely do that sort of thing.

139.

The qualification is necessary because at least a few leading figures doubted that the enumeration of congressional powers would have that effect. See infra Part III.A.
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tion as the most important mechanism for limiting federal power.140 This line
of thinking is a mistake. The Hamiltonian argument was not the wellconsidered theory of the Founding generation. It was a talking point that most
of that generation dismissed as implausible.
Second, the conventional approach implicitly treats the enumeration of
congressional powers as a matter of independent principle, rather than as a
strategic choice intended to preserve local decision making and individual
rights. The better reading is that the Founders saw enumeration as a means to
those ends, not as somehow valuable in itself. And as I explain below, fidelity
to choices about means sometimes differs from fidelity to choices about ends. If
the idea of a government limited by its enumerated powers had been a matter
of independent value to the Founders—that is, if the Founders would have insisted on internal limits as a mechanism for constraining federal power even
with the knowledge that other kinds of limits would be equally effective, or
more so, at preserving local decision making and protecting individual rights—
then the internal-limits canon might be part of what fidelity to their design required. But on the understanding that the choice to enumerate Congress’s
powers is better seen as a means to those ends, modern decision makers can be
faithful to the Founding design even if Congress is not in practice meaningfully
constrained by internal limits—provided, of course, that Congress exercises only the powers delegated to it, and provided also that local decision making and
individual rights are protected by other means within the constitutional design.
This second point is the focus of Part III.B.
A. How Important Were Internal Limits to the Founders?
Within American constitutional culture, a canonical story teaches that the
Founders considered internal limits more important than external ones. According to that story, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention believed
that the enumeration of congressional powers would limit the federal government. Indeed, the story continues, the Founders were so confident in the
mechanism of enumeration that they considered a Bill of Rights unnecessary,
or even counterproductive, because specifying affirmative prohibitions might
mislead people into thinking that Congress was not confined to its enumerated
powers.141 More than one important figure at the Founding articulated this idea
about the enumeration and a Bill of Rights: Madison and James Wilson, for
140.

See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Founding Revisited, 125 HARV. L. REV. 544, 560 (2011) (reviewing PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788
(2010)).

141.

See id.
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example, both prominently advanced the claim.142 But for modern audiences
the idea is most closely associated with Hamilton, whose exposition of the argument in Federalist 84 is perhaps its most canonical expression.143
Given the enormously important status that modern Americans afford to
the Bill of Rights, the normal role of this story is to make the enumeration and
its internal limits seem essential. After all, the reasoning runs, the drafters of
the Constitution considered the system of internal limits even more important
than express guarantees of free speech, free religious exercise, and so forth. In
NFIB, both Chief Justice Roberts and the joint dissent invoked this canonical
story as a way of making the point, on the authority of the Founders, that internal limits must play a central role in the constitutional design.144 But the canonical status of this story notwithstanding, it is a mistake to think that fidelity
to the Founding design requires operative internal limits. To begin to see why,
it may help to think critically about the canonical story. Two points are particularly worth noting.
First, the Convention’s omission of a Bill of Rights does not demonstrate
that the delegates regarded enumeration as the chief mechanism for constraining Congress.145 To most of the delegates, the most important mechanisms for
constraining Congress were neither external limits nor internal limits but process limits. The arrangements to which the Convention paid attention at length
and in detail concerned the composition of and relationships among decisionmaking institutions: popularly elected House and state-appointed Senate, sin142.

See, e.g., James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788), in 5
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 231-32 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904); James Wilson, Speech
at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct. 6, 1787), PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER,
Oct. 10, 1787, at 2 cols. 3-4.

143.

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing against the idea that the Constitution should include a Bill of Rights).

144.

See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577-78 (2012) (“Indeed, the Constitution did not initially include a Bill of Rights at least partly because the
Framers felt the enumeration of powers sufficed to restrain the Government.”); id. at 267677 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he Framers considered structural
protections of freedom the most important ones, for which reason they alone were embodied in the original Constitution and not left to later amendment.”). On its face, this passage
from the dissent speaks of structure in general—a category that includes process limits as
well as internal ones. But in context, the reference is clearly to internal limits, because the
dissent is explaining its insistence on enforcing an internal limit (on the commerce power)
rather than trusting a process limit (namely democratic elections).

145.

For one provocative alternative suggestion as to why the Convention’s draft did not include
a Bill of Rights, see William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 23940 (2012) (discussing Edmund Randolph’s desire to avoid a debate about fundamental issues of political morality that might prompt heated conflict among the delegates over the issue of slavery).
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gle-member executive chosen with a state-based mechanism, and so forth.146
The prevailing wisdom held that elections and state governments would keep
federal power in check, and if that didn’t work, then the states would use their
resources—political, financial, persuasive, even perhaps military—to rally public resistance against central authority.147 Some of these expectations turned out
to be chimerical.148 Others were vindicated, albeit to varying degrees and unevenly over time.149 But regardless of how one judges the successes and failures
of the attempt to check federal power by process mechanisms, it remains the
case that the Convention invested most heavily in this strategy. By comparison,
the attention paid to enumeration and internal limits was slight. Prior to the
appointment of the Committee of Detail, there was no deep engagement with
questions about whether this or that power should be included among the
powers of Congress, and the draft enumeration that the Committee presented
on August 6 was largely accepted by the full Convention, albeit with emendations.150 To be sure, none of this demonstrates that the Convention regarded

146.

According to Madison’s journal, discussion of such structural issues dominated the Convention from the presentation of the Virginia Plan on May 29 up until July 26, when the Convention adjourned for ten days to permit the Committee of Detail to do its work, and then
again from August 6 until the Convention rose on September 17, with few exceptions beyond those indicated. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 23-577 (Gaillard
Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920); see infra note 150.

147.

See Kramer, supra note 21, at 1492, 1515-20 (attributing this set of views to the drafters and
ratifiers of the Constitution); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (articulating
this perspective).

148.

Unless one counts the events of 1861, the states did not in practice act as organizing frameworks for the most robust forms of resistance to the extent that some prominent Founders
imagined they would. For one account of the reasons why state-based process limits failed
to materialize in the relevant ways, see Kramer, supra note 21, at 1492.

149.

The structure of the federal government always limits its activity, both because elections
limit what decision makers will do and because of the checks and balances that make formal
lawmaking difficult. So to take one leading and enormously consequential example, the
Founders expected that a bicameral Congress would impose more obstacles to federal lawmaking than a unicameral Congress would. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). They seem to have been right. We of course have no unicameral Congress to act as an
experimental control, but much modern experience indicates that the division of Congress
into two houses does act as a brake on federal legislation.

150.

Perhaps the most important changes that the Convention made to the Committee’s list of
enumerated powers were the elimination of a power to appoint a Treasurer, the addition of
the bankruptcy and patent powers, the specification of the power to govern the national capital city, and two or three adjustments to the powers related to the state militias and the national army. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, with 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 181-83 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (describing the record of August 6, 1787,
and reporting Article VII of the Report of the Committee of Detail).
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the enumeration as unimportant. Given the incomplete nature of the historical
evidence, the delegates may have paid more attention to the enumeration than
the surviving records reflect. But the available record strongly suggests that the
delegates’ greatest focus was on other mechanisms—principally process mechanisms—for limiting federal legislation.
Second, no matter what the Convention delegates may have thought, the
broader public decisively rejected the idea that the enumeration would limit
Congress well enough to make a Bill of Rights unnecessary. Yes, people like
Hamilton, Madison, and Wilson defended their work with that argument.151
But they utterly failed to persuade the public. Some contemporaries dismissed
the claim that enumeration would suffice as just a rationalizing afterthought—
an idea grasped at to parry Bill of Rights objections to the Constitution, rather
than an authentic and central piece of the Convention’s plan.152 Jefferson told
Madison directly that he considered the idea a ruse, one that might bamboozle
a credulous audience but which on its merits should not be taken seriously.153
After all, it was not obscure even in 1788 that the powers to tax, to regulate
commerce, to raise armies, and so forth could be deployed oppressively unless
affirmatively limited.154 So the cry for a Bill of Rights continued unabated.155
The inadequacy of the draft Constitution’s limits on federal power was a com-

151.

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
note 142, at 231-32; James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct. 6,
1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167-68
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).

152.

See Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights: The
View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 377-78 (2007). Note in particular that Hamilton’s warning (that the specification of external limits would dangerously imply that Congress could do anything not prohibited) may have been hard to take seriously given that the
proposed Constitution already did specify external limits. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9
(specifying prohibitions on Congress).

153.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826,
at 511-15 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (“To say, as Mr. Wilson does, that a bill of rights
was not necessary, because all is reserved in the case of the general government which is not
given . . . might do for the audience to which it was addressed; but it is surely a gratis dictum, the reverse of which might just as well be said[.]”).

154.

See, e.g., George Mason, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788), in 3
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 415-16 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].

155.

See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788,
at 56 (2010) (describing the continuing push for a Bill of Rights).
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mon and insistently pressed criticism during the ratification debates,156 and the
creation of vigorous external limits was one of the first orders of business once
the new system was up and running. Acting pragmatically, many delegates to
the state ratifying conventions chose to ratify the Constitution and fix the
problem immediately afterwards rather than insisting that the whole arduous
process be repeated from its beginning. But any idea that the Founding generation trusted Hamilton’s famous argument about internal limits is belied by the
first great fact about constitutional reform in the new Republic: the quick passage and ratification of the first ten Amendments. In short, the most important
feature of the Founding generation’s relationship to the idea that the enumeration would be sufficient for limiting Congress is this one: they didn’t buy it.
One could take the view that the Constitution’s defenders during the ratification debates were correct when they said that internal limits would do the
work, regardless of how they came to that view and even though they were unable to persuade their contemporaries. The idea might then be worth taking
seriously despite its rejection in its own time. But if so, the reason for thinking
this conception worthy of our respect is not the legal authority of the Founding.157 It is the first-order merits of the idea. And to conclude that the idea was
a good one, we would have to believe that the system of internal limits actually
would have sufficed for protecting individual rights and maintaining the substantive virtues of federalism more generally. Experience does not offer much
support for that view. As already described, internal limits do very little to constrain the scope of congressional regulation. One might hypothesize that the
ineffectiveness of internal limits is due to the existence of too many external
ones: if the public had acquiesced in the Convention’s design, the idea would
run, then a combination of process limits and internal limits would have been
forced to do the work, and they would have been adequate for the task. Or one
could argue that the inconsequentiality of internal limits is the result of regrettable decision making by officials—judicial and otherwise—who have failed to
apply Article I properly, rather than an inherent feature of the constitutional
design. But each of these possibilities is speculation at best. On the first score,
we cannot know how American constitutionalism would have developed in the
156.

See, e.g., id. (describing the continuing push for a Bill of Rights); see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (acknowledging the central place of this objection among the
various objections to ratification).

157.

Unless the authority of the Founding sounds in something other than respect for the outcome of a democratic process. See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1770 (1997) (suggesting that much originalism actually looks to the Founders on the theory that they were our
heroic ancestors, rather than on a theory of political legitimacy based on democratic processes).
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absence of as significant an occurrence as the adoption of the Bill of Rights. On
the second, much of the wisdom in sound constitutional design is the correct
anticipation of how officials will behave. At some point, the fact that officials
do not implement Article I in genuinely constraining ways indicates that Article
I is not a usefully constraining mechanism within this system of government.
Given how little Article I’s internal limits restrain Congress, the Founding
generation seems wise to have rejected the claim that enumerating Congress’s
powers would be sufficient to limit the federal government. Yes, things could
be different if things had been different. But it is also possible that resting on a
system of internal limits would always have been risky, and that at some point
those limits would have fallen short, just as the Founders feared. So there is a
substantial irony in play when constitutional lawyers invoke the idea that the
Founders gave pride of place to internal limits. Such invocations are probably
meant to celebrate the wisdom of the Founders—a wisdom, the idea either implicitly or explicitly runs, that may be lost on those who look to external limits
to do the important work.158 The greater wisdom of the Founding generation,
though, lay in its refusal to rest on a system of internal limits. It does not show
respect for the Founders to associate them with a flawed idea that they were
prescient enough to discard as overly optimistic. We would show them more
respect by associating them with the better ideas that they in fact endorsed.
B. Enumeration as a Means
The Founders rejected the idea that the enumeration would do all the
work, but they did approve a system in which internal limits played a role. The
crucial concern about enumerated powers and fidelity to the Founding, therefore, is not whether the enumeration should be sufficient for limiting Congress
even in the absence of external limits and process limits. It is whether internal
limits must operate as an essential feature of the system—whether it is necessary, in order to honor the choices of the Founders, for the internal limits of

158.

See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676-77 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“Structural protections—notably, the restraints imposed by federalism and separation of powers—are less romantic and have less
obvious a connection to personal freedom than the provisions of the Bill of Rights or the
Civil War Amendments. Hence they tend to be undervalued or even forgotten by our citizens. It should be the responsibility of the Court to teach otherwise, to remind our people
that the Framers considered structural protections of freedom the most important ones, for
which reason they alone were embodied in the original Constitution and not left to later
amendment.”). The structural principle whose apparent disregard this passage was written
to protest was, of course, that the enumeration of congressional powers is inherently limiting.
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Congress’s powers, taken as a whole, to meaningfully limit the scope of federal
legislation.
Because the concern of this Article is with the internal-limits canon rather
than with the scope of particular congressional powers, the relevant question
here requires looking to something more general than the original meanings of
the Commerce Clause, the Taxing Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause,
and so forth. As already explained, I am not arguing for any particular reading
of those or any other congressional powers. I am arguing against the idea that
all of those powers must be interpreted to conform with a principle that exists
at the level of general design—that is, that there are things that Congress cannot regulate even apart from the Constitution’s affirmative prohibitions. And
also as already explained, my argument is not that Congress does have the
practical equivalent of a police power under the conditions of 2014. It is that
Congress might turn out to have power that broad, depending on the best interpretations of its various powers and the mapping of those powers, so interpreted, onto the present social world. So if it were the case that current constitutional law should track the original meanings of relevant constitutional
clauses (whether on an original-public-meaning view or otherwise) and if it
were further the case that the powers of Congress would add up to less than a
police power if given their individual meanings, summed together, and applied
today, then it would be the case that Congress is now meaningfully constrained
by internal limits on its powers. But it would be the case only as a matter of
contingency. To show that it must be the case as a matter of design requires a
different kind of analysis—one that goes to Founding-era ideas about the function of the enumeration as a whole, rather than to the meanings of particular
grants of power within it.
At the level of design, it is still the dominant conventional view that respect
for the decisions of the Founders requires the internal-limits canon. The bases
for that view are not obscure. So long as we remain conscious of the difficulties
involved in attributing a complex view to a large and vaguely defined group
like “the Founders,” and subject to the caveat that the Founders knew better
than to trust the project of limiting Congress to internal limits alone, it is reasonable to say that the Founders intended the enumeration to play a role in
limiting the jurisdiction of Congress.
It does not follow, though, that fidelity to the Founders’ design requires
modern decision makers to identify consequential internal limits on Congress’s
powers, because the relevant question is not whether the Founders expected
internal limits to do that work. It is whether that expectation creates obligations today. This question is not simply a recapitulation of a more general
question about the authority of original meanings, though there are points of
contact between the present concern and that larger debate. Even if original
meanings can bind later generations, the Founders’ ideas about limiting con-
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gressional power could be vindicated in the ways that matter even if internal
limits turned out to impose no constraints on modern federal legislation.
To see why, it is important to recognize that the Founders’ decision to
enumerate congressional powers is better understood as a matter of strategy
than as a matter of principle. Those two categories are not always mutually exclusive, and it is possible to construe both “strategy” and “principle” in ways
that would place the internal-limits approach under either heading. My statement that enumeration is better understood as a strategy simply means that the
Founders understood enumeration as a means to an end, or a set of ends, rather than as a matter of independent value. The point of enumerating Congress’s powers was to help secure an adequately empowered but properly limited central government.159 The idea was that Congress should have the ability
to do what the nation needs done, but it should neither deny individual rights
nor imperil local decision making. Enumeration was a means to those ends.
Madison spoke of the matter that way.160 So did Hamilton.161 So did James

159.

Both halves—empowerment and limitation—were important. Madison, for example, expressed at the Convention that, in defining the powers of Congress, his major worry was to
give Congress enough power, rather than to prevent it from having too much. See, e.g., 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 356-58 (describing the
record for June 21, 1787).

160.

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294-95 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(explaining that giving Congress only a particular set of powers would help preserve state
power against federal interference by ensuring that the people would remain more attached
to their state governments than to the federal government, because the only thing that could
cause the people to switch loyalty would be better administration on the federal side; accordingly, “the State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a
certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered”); see also James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 24,
1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 142, at 231-32 (explaining that
enumerating the powers of Congress would be a safer way to protect essential individual
rights than listing rights in the manner of external limits); Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 142, at
269, 271-72 (same). Note, too, that Madison’s doubts about the system of enumeration
tracked his sense of the effectiveness of that system as a means to the desired ends. See James
Madison’s Notes from the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 53 (“Mr. Madison said that he had
brought with him into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also
brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his doubts
had become stronger. What his opinion might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he
should shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form of Govt. as
would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the Community. This being the end
of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be
submitted to.”).
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Wilson,162 Edmund Randolph,163 John Rutledge,164 and Oliver Ellsworth,165
who collectively constituted four-fifths of the committee that actually drafted

161.

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 510-20 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(arguing that enumerating Congress’s powers was the best way to secure individual rights
against federal interference). To be comprehensive, one should note that Hamilton’s classic
remonstrance against adding a Bill of Rights to the Constitution spoke in two voices. In a
means-ends vein, Hamilton praised the enumeration as the best way to secure individual
rights because the other leading candidate for that job—the specification of external limits—
would dangerously imply that the federal government could exercise whatever powers did
not contravene those limits, thus affording a pretext for people who wished to argue for unduly large constructions of governmental power. Id. at 513-14. In a considerably less instrumental vein, he also argued that the affirmative specification of rights against government
power was fundamentally contrary to the premises of the Constitution. Such affirmative
specifications were the stuff of concessions wrung from sovereign princes, as was the case
with Magna Carta or the English Bill of Rights. As a matter of principle, Hamilton wrote, a
declaration of rights would be completely out of place in a constitution founded on the idea
that all power flows from the people. See id. at 512-13. The fact that Hamilton made both arguments suggests that he expected his audience to contain people who would respond favorably to each: he was, after all, writing a document intended to persuade people to vote in
favor of the Constitution. But if we credit Hamilton with a bit of self-awareness in the writing of Federalist No. 84, it would be hard to take seriously the idea that he believed the matter-of-principle argument, because Federalist No. 84 lauds the Convention’s draft Constitution for all of the affirmative specifications of rights that it did contain—to habeas corpus, to
jury trial, against bills of attainder, against convictions for treason without the testimony of
two witnesses, and so on. See id. at 511-12. If the Constitution is to be praised for containing
these provisions, then it cannot be the case that external limits are categorically unsuitable
for the work at hand. The same point also undermines Hamilton’s first argument, of course.
Given the express external limits on congressional power in Article I, Section 9, it is hard to
take seriously the claim that the reason for omitting a Bill of Rights was that the specification of external limits would dangerously imply that Congress could use its powers to do
anything not affirmatively prohibited. If such an implication would arise from the specification of external limits, it would arise from Section 9. Again, the point is obvious enough to
make it seem likely that Hamilton understood the weakness of his own argument, as well as
obvious enough to make it unremarkable for contemporary readers to have dismissed the
idea as illogical and tendentious.

162.

See, e.g., James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 151,
at 350, 355 (explaining that an enumeration had been chosen as the best means of demarcating the boundary between the authority of the national government and that of the states);
James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 26, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 154, at 424-25 (explaining that the Constitution enumerates Congress’s powers because such an enumeration is a good way to ensure that the federal and
state governments each maintain jurisdiction over matters that should be within their respective authorities); James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct.
28, 1787), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 154, at 436-37 (arguing that enumerating the
powers of government is a safer means of securing individual rights than enumerating the
rights of individuals because the risk of an omission in the Constitution would then fall on
the government rather than on individuals).
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the enumeration.166 The point here is not, of course, that every statement about
the enumeration by every important Founding figure clearly articulates a
means-ends orientation. The Founders were many people saying many
things—including, here and there, that the enumeration would not limit Congress.167 The point is simply that understanding enumeration as a strategy rather than as a matter of independent normative value is true to an important
way that many key Founders discussed the matter, such that characterizing the
enumeration that way recovers a Founding-era conception rather than inventing a new one. Had the Convention delegates believed that an enumeration
would not help the new government strike a good balance between federal and
state power, they might well have done without one.
As things have turned out, the enumeration is not very helpful to the cause
of striking such a balance. The internal-limits strategy has for a long time done
little meaningful work. So it is fortunate that the Founders did not put all their
eggs in the internal-limits basket. As already noted, the Convention was concerned primarily with process limits, and the broader public insisted on additional external limits precisely because it did not trust the argument that internal ones would be adequate. Today, it is those other kinds of limits that do the
work of protecting individual rights and preserving robust roles for state and
local governance. The question, then, is whether fidelity requires modern deci163.

See Edmund Randolph, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 17, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 154, at 463 (describing the enumeration as an effective mechanism for the protection of individual liberties).

164.

See James Madison’s Notes from the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at 53 (saying that the powers
of Congress should be enumerated so as to prevent the vagueness of a more general course
from resulting in excessive extension of those powers).

165.

See Roger Sherman & Oliver Ellsworth, Sherman and Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut
(Sept. 26, 1787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 150, at
99 (explaining that the enumeration was intended to preserve considerable autonomy for
state decision making).

166.

The fifth member was Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts. I have been unable to locate
sources in which Gorham addressed the rationale for the enumeration. For an excellent
analysis of what can and cannot be known based on the surviving documentary evidence regarding the work of the Committee of Detail, see Ewald, supra note 145, at 259-69.

167.

See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at 513
(James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (disbelieving Wilson’s public protestation that the enumeration would limit Congress’s powers); George Mason, Alterations Proposed (Aug. 31,
1787), in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 251 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987); Edmund Randolph, Reasons for Not Signing the
Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 260, 273 (John Kaminski & Gaspare Saladino eds., 1988).
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sion makers to use a strategy that does not work particularly well when other
strategies the Founding generation blessed are available to do the work better.
The answer depends on whether there was an original commitment to the
strategy as such, independent of its usefulness for achieving a set of goals. If so,
fidelity to the Founders might require maintaining internal limits. But if not,
modern decision makers can be perfectly faithful to the Founding design even
if this particular strategy does no work at all, so long as they respect the commitments that the Founders did make and use other mechanisms to protect
federalism and individual rights.
Consider the following hypothetical scenario as a relevantly parallel case.
Charles’s last will and testament instructed his granddaughter Charlotte to use
her inheritance to attend Radcliffe College. The will explained that this course
of action was intended to help Charlotte achieve a financially secure adulthood.
When Charles died in 1950, he had a clear expectation about the mechanism by
which this strategy would succeed: Charlotte would meet and marry a Harvard
man. But if Charlotte were to attend Radcliffe, and then law school, and then
make a career as an attorney, she could both comply with her grandfather’s instruction and fulfill his ultimate purpose, whether or not she married rich, and
whether or not attending Radcliffe had been a necessary step in the process.
(Presumably she could have become a successful lawyer even if she had gone to
college elsewhere.)
Has Charlotte been faithful to her grandfather’s design? She used the money to go to Radcliffe, not to tour Europe, and not even to attend Smith or
Mount Holyoke or Bryn Mawr. She parlayed her education into a lucrative
adulthood, rather than becoming a starving artist or a social worker or a missionary. So she both followed the specific directive in the will and achieved her
grandfather’s articulated end. Without knowing more, that seems like enough
to describe her actions as faithful to his design, even though the mechanism by
which she achieved his end was different from the one he imagined.
If we sense that Charlotte subverted her grandfather’s plan while adhering
to its formal requirements, it is probably because we think that Charles understood Charlotte’s marrying a wealthy man (or at least a man with good prospects) as a matter of independent value—that he would not have been content
for his granddaughter to find financial security by dint of her own career. One
can certainly imagine Charles as having held that view. But we cannot establish
that he held that view on the basis of his will, the text of which does not speak
of Charlotte’s marriage. Nor would it settle the question if Charlotte reported
that her grandfather had told her before his death that he hoped she would
marry well. Maybe he was simply talking about what seemed to him a natural
solution, given the world he knew, rather than specifying that no other solution would be acceptable.
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In the absence of a clear showing that Charles regarded marriage as the indispensable mechanism, it neither helps Charlotte nor flatters Charles to doubt
that Charlotte adhered faithfully to the terms of her grandfather’s bequest. After all, we cannot doubt Charlotte’s fidelity without casting Charles as unattractively stubborn. If we remember Charles as a sensible man or even a wise
one, we would attribute to him the understanding that he might not foresee
everything about the future, as well as the desire for his granddaughter to do
well in ways that made sense in light of the world she lived in, even if he would
also want her to respect the terms of the gift he made. On that understanding,
it would make sense to conclude that Charles would be satisfied with Charlotte’s decisions. She both adhered to the rule he laid down and realized the
end that he wished for her. Not in exactly the way he expected, but in a way
consistent with her obligations to him.
I take it as given that Congress can legislate only on the basis of powers
delegated to it under the Constitution, just as Charlotte must use her inheritance to attend Radcliffe rather than Smith. The text of each governing instrument makes that a rule.168 But unless the Founders were committed to
overall internal limits as a matter of value rather than as a means to an end, fidelity does not require that internal limits be the mechanism limiting Congress
any more than fidelity to Charles requires Charlotte’s marrying someone she
met in college to be the mechanism by which she attains financial security. The
question, then, is whether we should understand the Founders as committed to
internal limits as a value-based matter rather than as a strategic one. Why, if at
all, should we think that the Founders regarded the enumeration of internally
limited powers as a mechanism that must do meaningful work in limiting Congress, rather than as a mechanism they expected to do a fair amount of that
work?
In part for reasons that I will explain in more depth in Part IV, the answer
cannot be the text of the Constitution. To be sure, the Tenth Amendment and
the structure of Article I, Section 8 both imply that the Founders intended the
enumerated powers as less than a general grant of regulatory authority. But
neither text requires understanding that intention as a binding commitment
for the construction of the enumerated powers, rather than as an expectation
about how the system would function. Note that the Constitution in many re-

168.

Or almost does. As careful readers have noticed for more than a century, the Tenth Amendment may not quite say that the federal government can only act on the basis of powers delegated to it. It leaves open the possibility that the federal government can act on the basis of
powers prohibited to the states, whether or not those powers are delegated to the federal
government. See, e.g., TIEDEMAN, supra note 54. But that wrinkle does not affect the present
argument.
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spects reflects certain expectations without demanding that those expectations
be made real. The Post Office Clause,169 for example, reflects the Founders’ expectation that people would communicate via written documents that would be
physically carried from place to place. But no constitutional principle would be
violated if that system of communication were to disappear at some point after
the coming of the Internet. It would simply be the case that the Framers had
certain expectations about how the system would function that turned out, after a time, to be at variance with the world’s actual conditions.170 So yes, (most
of) the Framers expected the enumeration to help preserve state autonomy and
protect individual rights. To adapt Chief Justice Marshall’s formula from Gibbons, they “presupposed” it,171 just as the Post Office Clause presupposed the
utility of a postal system and just as Grandfather Charles presupposed that
marriage was a woman’s ticket to financial comfort. Article I was written with
the expectation that the enumerated powers would be limiting, and the Tenth
Amendment was written with the expectation that the powers delegated to the
United States would have narrower scope than a grant of general legislative
power would. But as both the Post Office Clause and Grandfather Charles’s
will illustrate, a text can be written in light of certain expectations without embodying a demand that those expectations be realized.
If it is not clear that the Founders thought of enumeration as more than a
means to an end, then there are good reasons not to attribute that idea to them.
First, and as noted above, leading Founders discussed the matter in instrumental terms.172 Second, an instrumental view of enumeration is more consistent
with the image of the Founders as “practical statesmen, not metaphysical philosophers.”173 The idea of enumeration as a means is straightforwardly practical: to protect state decision making and individual rights, give Congress only a
limited set of powers. Finally, it bears remembering that one of the best modern value-based reasons for prizing the system of enumeration is one that

169.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.

170.

At that point, the Post Office Clause might become either a provision without practical consequence or, depending on how things worked out, a clause that acquired uses different
from those that the Founders imagined.

171.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824). I say “adapt” because the enumeration
to which Chief Justice Marshall referred in Gibbons was not the enumeration of congressional powers in the eighteen clauses of Article I, Section 8. It was the enumeration of three
kinds of commerce in the third clause of Section 8. Id.

172.

Again, this is not to say that it is impossible to find statements from the Founding that seem
to endow the enumeration with greater significance. But at the very least, the historical record makes it hard to speak of a clear Founding commitment to treating the internal-limits
approach as more than a means.

173.

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012).
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would have had no purchase for the Founders. Today, affirming the role of the
enumeration displays loyalty to a tradition we inherit, at least at the level of
discourse and professed principle. The Founders approached the issue free of
any such consideration. For them, authority and tradition did not much bear
on how best to understand Congress, and their opportunity to confront the
question as a matter of practical wisdom was commensurately greater.174
If the Founders regarded enumeration largely as a practical strategy, then it
matters when thinking about fidelity to the Founders that the enumeration
strategy is not practical. Maybe it was practical once upon a time: internal limits seemed175 meaningful in the Founders’ own lifetimes and for some period
thereafter.176 But as the Founders foresaw, the system of internal limits could
not be trusted to do the job by itself, and it has not worked well in a very long
time. It shows no disrespect to the Founders to say that one of their strategies
was effective for fewer than two hundred years, especially when we also remember that they were thoughtful enough to include other strategies that continue to be effective. Perhaps an undying commitment to a strategy that no
longer works displays a certain kind of loyalty, but it is not a particularly helpful kind. Nor, assuming the Founders to have been reasonable and intelligent
people, is it the kind of loyalty that the Founders would have wanted their successors to show.
On the generally warranted assumption that the leading Founders were sophisticated about human behavior, we should take for granted that they understood that not all of their strategies would succeed forever in quite the way they
174.

The point here is not, of course, that the Founders confronted the world as if it were entirely
new, rather than being in any way influenced by or even partial to traditions of which they
approved. The point is more local: the Founders did not confront Congress as an institution
steeped in tradition, nor did they inherit a pre-congressional tradition of describing a national legislature (say, Parliament) as a government of enumerated powers. Modern Americans do inherit a tradition of describing Congress that way.

175.

I include this hedge to acknowledge the possibility that, even early in the history of the Republic, the real work of limitation was done by forces other than the limiting power of the
enumeration. See supra Part II.

176.

Note that Charles’s strategy for Charlotte made sense at the time that he formulated it, just
as the Founders’ expectation that internal limits would do meaningful work as part of the
overall system of limits made sense in the 1780s. Only over time did Charles’s expected
mechanism for ensuring Charlotte’s financial security become less likely to be the way in
which that end was realized. Or to make the cases more parallel, imagine this variation:
Charles dies in 1894 rather than 1950, leaving a large endowment and the instruction that
his female descendants in each subsequent generation should use the proceeds to attend
Radcliffe. For a while, the plan probably works—when it works—mostly in the way that
Charles imagined. Eventually, some of Charles’s female descendants follow the instruction
in a somewhat different way, and over time that different way becomes more and more the
norm.
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initially imagined. Their insistence on including external limits testifies to their
recognition—or at least their suspicion—that enumeration might not be adequate for checking Congress, either in their own day or in the foreseeable future. And so long as external limits and process limits do the work of preserving state decision making and protecting individual rights, the system remains
faithful to its Founding design. To say otherwise—to insist that the enumeration do meaningful work even when other mechanisms get the job done—is to
mistake the object of constitutional fidelity. It confuses a practical choice with a
value choice and a tool with the purpose it is supposed to serve.
iv . t e x t
My argument about what fidelity to the Founding design requires should
not be confused with a suggestion that modern decision makers are free to
adopt any view of congressional power that is at some high level of generality
consistent with the Founders’ wish that state and local governments wield considerable decision-making authority. Constitutional law is more constraining
than that; the Constitution frequently says what officials must do and how
they must do it, rather than simply what their purposes must be. For example,
the process for constitutional amendment under Article V requires the assent of
three-fourths of the states, and we cannot interpret Article V to permit
amendment with only three-fifths of the states, or with states whose combined
populations comprise three-fourths of the national population whether or not
those states also comprise three-fourths of the states, even if we decided that
one of those alternatives would be a more sensible threshold for vindicating the
Founders’ purposes in creating an amendment process than the one Article V
now provides.177 Sometimes the text of the Constitution just prescribes rules,
the contravention of which is unconstitutional. So even if neither federalism
nor the vision of the Founders requires the internal-limits canon, the canon
might still be mandatory in light of the text of the Constitution.
In my view, the text of the Constitution does not so require. But as noted
before, I am not arguing that the Constitution confers the equivalent of plenary
power on Congress. It might, or it might not, depending on the best constructions of many different powers and the relationship between those powers and
the social world at any given time. My argument leaves room for disagreement

177.
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This statement about interpretive impossibility means what such statements should always
mean: not that it is impossible to imagine a clever reading yielding that interpretation, but
that such an interpretation could not be persuasive to the community of constitutional practitioners under any foreseeable circumstances. See Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, supra note 55, at 1102-04.
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about the meaning of the Constitution’s power-conferring clauses, including
the Commerce Clause. If it turned out that on the best reading of all of the
powers, Congress possessed less than general regulatory authority, it would be
true that the powers of Congress are subject to overall internal limits. But the
conclusion would have been established without the influence of a fallacious
rule—the internal-limits canon—forbidding any construction on which Congress turned out to have plenary power in practice. My argument about the text
of the Constitution takes no position on whether the sum total of Congress’s
powers is equivalent in scope to a police power. Instead, my argument is that
the text is best read to make the answer to that question a matter of contingency, rather than a categorical no.
The traditional view is that Article I and the Tenth Amendment do require
the categorical no that the internal-limits canon directs. From a certain perspective, those readings of the relevant texts are sensible. But what makes them
sensible is the preconception that internal limits are necessary for maintaining
federalism, for respecting the intentions of the Founders, or for some combination of the two.178 If those preconceptions were correct, then it would be easy to
enlist the text in support. As I have already argued, however, those preconceptions should be set aside. Without those preconceptions, neither Article I nor
the Tenth Amendment requires that internal limits do meaningful work.
A. The Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment reads as follows: “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”179 This sentence is often
read to confirm the idea that the powers of Congress are, collectively, less than
a general grant of regulatory authority. The logic of that reading is easy to reconstruct. First, the Amendment speaks of “powers not delegated by the Constitution to the United States,” which implies that there are such powers. Next,
the Amendment directs that such powers (except those that are “prohibited . . .
178.

There is nothing unusual about this phenomenon: many constitutional interpretations are
formed under the joint influence of several different kinds of constitutional reasoning. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194-1209 (1987). If we have a correct understanding of the demands of
federalism, for example, then it can make sense to read ambiguous text in the way that supports rather than undermines those demands. But if something in our thinking about federalism is confused, it would be a mistake to let that confusion color our interpretation of the
text, lest that unnecessary reading of the text later come to seem to us (or our successors) to
be evidence that the Constitution forbids us to correct our thinking about federalism.

179.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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to the States”) are “reserved to the States . . . or to the people,” meaning that
they cannot be exercised by the federal government. Accordingly, the Tenth
Amendment provides that Congress can exercise those powers delegated to the
federal government and no others (again subject to the exception for powers
prohibited to the states). Unless the Amendment states a rule with no applications, therefore, the powers delegated to the federal government must encompass less than general regulatory authority. Assuming that an Amendment
should not be interpreted to be devoid of applications, the principle that the
powers of Congress are only a subset of all possible legislative powers is prescribed by the Tenth Amendment.
The first thing to notice about this argument is what it concedes: the proposition that some powers must be withheld from Congress is not fully specified
in the words of the Tenth Amendment. It rests also on an assumption about
how the Tenth Amendment is supposed to operate. Everyone recognizes this
feature of the reading, including the Supreme Court, even in some of its most
state-protective moments. In New York v. United States, for example, the Court
explained that the Tenth Amendment’s limit on the powers of Congress “is not
derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself.”180 After all, the Tenth
Amendment does not say, “The powers delegated to Congress must be construed, collectively, as less than a grant of general jurisdiction.” Instead, the
Tenth Amendment supplies a rule applicable in cases where the delegated
powers would not authorize federal legislation, and we infer from the existence
of such a rule that there must be limits to what the delegated powers can reach.
We make that inference not because the words of the text require it but because
of something we think we know about how such a text is supposed to operate.
What we think we know is that constitutional clauses must have applications.
People do not bother to amend constitutions with provisions that do no work.
The foregoing argument traffics in an idea about the authors and ratifiers
of the Tenth Amendment—specifically, that they must have meant their text to
have applications. But the contention that it makes no sense to read the Tenth
Amendment in a way that deprives its stated rule of all applications need not
point to any evidence about the actual views of particular eighteenth-century
Americans, other than whatever such evidence might be furnished by the
Tenth Amendment itself. The idea that these words must have applications is
an instance of an idea that might prevail in textual interpretation generally:
that enacted texts should not be construed to have no meaning.181 Whatever we
180.

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).

181.

See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory
construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” (quoting

630

the limits of enumeration

know (or cannot know) about the Founders, this line of thinking maintains, it
makes no sense to approach text in the Constitution as if it were meaningless.
The fact that this argument is easily made based on a commonsense reading of
the text alone probably accounts for some of its appeal. But whether we understand the argument as “purely textual” or as some combination of textualist
and originalist, the proposition that the Tenth Amendment’s words must have
applications is a common idea about how that text must be read. And whichever way we understand the argument, it has the same basic flaw. It confuses a
proposition about the motivations of constitution-makers with a proposition
about the functioning of constitutions.
The confusion is easily stated. One can reasonably assume that people do
not write rules that they know will never have applications. But it does not follow that every rule people write has, or in the future will have, applications.
Sometimes people write rules providing for situations that might arise, just in
case. Sometimes the world turns out to be different from what the writers of a
rule expected, such that an anticipated set of applications fails to materialize or
dissolves over time. This last possibility is especially plausible for rules that
remain in place for long periods of time, because the circumstances for which a
rule was written might be characteristic of the world the authors knew but not
of the world at all later times. So even if we assume that the authors of rules
expect those rules to have applications, it would be a mistake to assume that
every rule people write will turn out to have applications forever. To be sure, it
is prudent, upon discovering that a rule has no applications, to ask whether the
rule is being read correctly. But it is not at all prudent to take a discovery that a
rule has no present applications as proof that the rule is being wrongly read.
Consider an example that carries none of the baggage of debates about constitutional theory. Imagine the Wolverine Summer Day Camp, located in
southeastern Michigan and founded in 1970. The bylaws of the camp, adopted
at the time of its founding, contain the following rule: “On days when the
temperature is not forecast to exceed ninety degrees Fahrenheit, campers will
spend the day outdoors.” It is reasonable to infer from the existence of this rule
that the authors of the bylaws expected there to be some summer days with
temperatures above ninety degrees and other summer days with maximum
temperatures below ninety degrees. In a given year, however, it might turn out
that the temperature was forecast to exceed ninety degrees on every day of the

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be
without effect . . . .”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying
Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (describing the strong tendency Amar observes among
incoming law students to want to make every word in a legal document meaningful).
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summer camping season. If that happened, the rule would have no applications. Campers might spend the entire summer inside, and if they did, the rule
would not have been violated. (Whether the rule should be revised at that
point is a separate question.)
When the bylaws were adopted in 1970, it probably seemed far-fetched to
think that southeastern Michigan could have a summer in which the temperature exceeded ninety degrees on every single day. But in 2014, it is easier to imagine that circumstance becoming a reality. Indeed, it is easier to imagine it becoming a reality on a permanent basis, or at least to imagine that days when the
rule could be invoked would become exceedingly rare. If that happened, the
rule would lie dormant. But it would not be violated. It would simply testify
that the people who wrote the rule felt it important to address a situation that
no longer presented itself.
As a matter of textual interpretation, the Tenth Amendment is properly analyzed in the same way. For a long time after its adoption in 1791, the text of
the Amendment addressed a situation that arose in practice. Later, that situation dissolved, either entirely or nearly so. After that change in circumstances,
the fact that the rule stated in the Tenth Amendment has virtually no applications does not mean that the Tenth Amendment is being violated. The rule
simply does not come into play. It poses no problem for this understanding to
say that the Founders must have expected the Amendment to have some function. Of course they did—and indeed, the Amendment’s stated rule did have
applications when they wrote it. But there is no reason to think that a sensible
construction of a text can only be one that ensures the text has applications always and forever. A clause can be perfectly worth adopting even if it only has
consequences for a hundred years.
It is worth being clear about two limits of the present argument, each of
which concerns the subtle but crucial distinction between the text and the operative content of a given constitutional provision. First, even if the rule stated
in the text of the Tenth Amendment has no contemporary applications, it need
not follow that the Tenth Amendment has no contemporary applications, because a constitutional provision as applied sometimes has force different from
what an untutored reader of the text might expect.182 And indeed, I am not arguing that the Tenth Amendment has no applications in modern constitutional
law. As a matter of doctrine, the anticommandeering rule of New York v. United
States183 and the sovereign-immunity rule of Alden v. Maine184 are applications
182.

The First Amendment applies against the executive branch, and uncontroversially so, despite being textually addressed only to “Congress.” See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

183.

New York, 505 U.S. at 155-57, 161.
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of the Tenth Amendment, at least in part. These cases did not apply the rule
stated in the text of the Tenth Amendment, as the Court in both cases
acknowledged.185 They applied a related but not identical proposition about the
value of state sovereignty, one that is best understood as arising from some
combination of a theory of constitutional structure and a view of Founding-era
history. Nonetheless, constitutional practice usually associates constitutional
doctrines with particular clauses, even when the text of those clauses does not
quite state the relevant doctrines.186 We unhesitatingly apply the First
Amendment against the federal executive, despite its being addressed to “Congress,” because we associate the First Amendment with the general idea that
the government must respect the freedoms of speech and religion.187 There is a
similar association between the Tenth Amendment and the general idea of state
sovereignty as a limit on federal power, and that association allows Alden and
New York to be classified as applications of the Tenth Amendment.188
The Tenth Amendment rule that I have argued may have no present applications is the rule prescribed by the literal text of the Tenth Amendment, not
the more robust rule invoked in Alden and New York. So if the Court has construed the Tenth Amendment correctly, it remains true even today that the
Amendment continues to do work. It just might not do the work of directing
results in cases where Congress has enacted legislation exceeding the internal
limits of its delegated powers, because that situation might no longer arise. Instead, the Tenth Amendment now has applications as a source of external limits
on congressional power. New York and Alden limit what Congress can do under
any of its Article I powers, and they do so on the basis of something outside of
the enumeration rather than by the terms of any clause conferring power on
Congress. Currently prevailing doctrine on commandeering and sovereign
immunity is controversial, and I do not mean to take a position here on whether New York and Alden were rightly decided. But whatever the merits of these
particular decisions, the existence of judicially enforceable external limits on
congressional power is entirely consistent with the argument of this Article.
My point about the Tenth Amendment is simply that its text does not compel
the conclusion that there must be internal limits.

184.

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).

185.

Id.; New York, 505 U.S. at 155-57.

186.

Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1934).

187.

See, e.g., New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713.

188.

See, e.g., Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 67 (2014) (characterizing New York as a Tenth Amendment case); Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 275 n.50 (2012) (linking Alden to the Tenth Amendment).
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Second, I am not arguing that the Tenth Amendment cannot possibly be
read to support the internal-limits canon. The text of the Tenth Amendment
does not require the powers of Congress to be construed as internally limited,
and in my view no sound principle of constitutional interpretation forbids
reading that text to mean what it says. But again, it often happens that a constitutional provision is taken to mean something different from what is stated
in its text. The Tenth Amendment itself is a prominent example, as just discussed: the Supreme Court already takes that provision to embody a proposition of federalism that is related to, rather than contained within, its text.189 So
if the substantive idea that the powers of Congress must be construed as internally limited is a valid constitutional principle—because federalism requires it,
or because the Founders’ intentions require it, or for any other reason—then it
would be consistent with the way American constitutional interpretation works
to read the Tenth Amendment to represent that idea. But if neither federalism
nor fidelity requires the powers of Congress to have meaningful internal limits,
then there is no reason to (mis)read the Amendment as making such limits
mandatory. On its own, the text of the Tenth Amendment contains no such
rule.
B. Article I
The other main textual arguments for the necessity of internal limits focus
on Article I, Section 8.190 Again, the relevant arguments are not close readings
189.

See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57 (acknowledging that the text of the Tenth Amendment does not contain the relevant rule). The Eleventh Amendment is another example. See
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts,
‘we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but
for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’” (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991))).

190.

It is also possible to advance a textual argument based on Article I, Section 1, which says,
“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. The
words “herein granted” might imply the existence of other legislative powers not granted,
and that implication could draw support from the contrast with the language of the Vesting
Clauses of Articles II and III, neither of which uses the “herein granted” language and which
can therefore be read to indicate that the use of that language in Article I was purposeful. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive power shall be vested . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested . . . .”). It is hard to evaluate
the strength of this interpretation as a purely textual matter. The “herein granted” language
will bear the meaning described here, but that is not the only meaning it will bear, and the
contrast with the other Vesting Clauses might bespeak the intention described, and it also
might not. Even if read for all it might be worth, though, the Vesting Clause would demon-
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of the several power-conferring clauses of Section 8, deployed in combination
(and in combination with readings of the Constitution’s many other clauses
conferring power on Congress) to show that the sum total of the powers leaves
Congress unable to legislate on some set of topics. That kind of argument
might or might not be successful. But even if such an argument successfully revealed limits on Congress’s overall power to legislate, it would not be germane
to the validity of the internal-limits canon. The canon is a rule for construing
the powers of Congress (“Under no circumstances may you read these powers
such that they end up covering all possible subjects of legislation”), not a description of something that one would discover after construing the powers
without the influence of that rule (“Hey, I read all these grants of power and
thought about what they add up to collectively, and it turns out that they don’t
exhaust all possible subjects of legislation”). A textual argument for the internal-limits canon would have to support the rule itself in a way conceptually
prior to the interpretation and summation of many individual powers. And
since nothing in Article I states the internal-limits canon directly, the Article I
arguments for the internal-limits canon are not close readings of particular
constitutional passages. They are readings of the structure of Section 8, considered as a whole.
To be precise, there are two textual arguments from Article I, both building
from the foundation that Section 8 confers a long list of particular powers.
First, there is the argument against generality. That argument, in short, is that
it makes no sense to read a list of particular powers as equivalent to a grant of
general power, because a list of specifics is a strange way to denote something
general. If Article I were designed to confer general legislative power, it could
just say so.191 Second, there is the argument against redundancy. This argument
holds that it makes no sense to read one power in a list of powers—say, the
commerce power—so expansively that its scope approaches that of a police
power. To do so would make most of the rest of the list redundant. And it is

strate only that the Founders intended for the powers listed in Section 8 to be less than a
grant of general jurisdiction, and we knew that already. The Clause does not tell us that they
regarded that fact about Section 8 as having value independent of its instrumental tendency
to protect state decision making and individual rights, nor does it by its terms preclude the
possibility that the granted powers would turn out to reach more subjects of potential regulation than the Founders initially anticipated.
191.

For one set of contrasting views on the merits of this argument, compare Kurt T. Lash,
“Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve Collective Action Problems Under
Article I, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123 (2012), which supports the traditional view
that the enumeration’s list of particulars should not be read as a general power, with Robert
D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8,
63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 123 (2010), which supports the opposite view.
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odd, this argument maintains, to construe a text with eighteen different clauses
in a way that makes most of those clauses superfluous.192
The two arguments have much in common, including the assumption that
a reasonable inference about how a text was expected to function is also a reasonable inference about how the text will function. That assumption is out of
place here, just as it was with respect to the Tenth Amendment.
Consider first the argument against generality. Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum that an enumeration presupposes something not enumerated is traditionally mobilized to support this idea: a specific list is something that people write
when they want to distinguish those things that are on the list from other
things that are not on the list.193 The basic logic here is that of the familiar interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius: the specification of one thing
is the exclusion of another. As a general matter, expressio unius is a sensible interpretive intuition, so long as it is treated as rebuttable where the particulars
so direct. So it is easy to note that the Constitution provides a long list of specific congressional powers, recite expressio unius, quote Chief Justice Marshall,
and rest confident in the view that the internal-limits canon must be correct.194
But things are not so simple. For starters, this thought process bundles the
enumeration principle and the internal-limits canon closely together and in so
doing obscures a slippery transition between two steps of reasoning. The first
step, which is the one that corresponds to the enumeration principle, goes like
this: the Constitution specifies many powers of Congress, and we take that to
mean that Congress may act only on the basis of those powers. But the second
192.

See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 589 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (making
this argument).

193.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.”); see also Regan, supra note 8, at 556 (“The mere fact of an enumeration of powers makes it clear that the federal government’s powers are meant to be limited.”).

194.

As noted in Part I.A, supra, there is some question about whether Congress has only those
powers that the Constitution literally enumerates or whether it also has powers that are delegated without being enumerated in the literal sense. The expressio unius argument would
apply in somewhat different form depending on which perspective one adopted. If the powers of Congress are all enumerated in the literal sense, the expressio unius argument provides
that the enumeration of certain powers implies the denial of all powers not enumerated. If
“enumerated” is a term of art that includes powers delegated even though not expressly
spelled out, the expressio unius argument provides that the enumeration of certain powers
implies that not every power is given. Readers who take seriously the case law identifying
some congressional powers as unenumerated will be drawn to one form, and readers who
take literally the familiar axiom that the federal government is one of enumerated powers
will be drawn to the other. Either way, though, the idea is that the Constitution would not
separately identify the many different powers of Congress if Congress were in fact empowered to do everything that a general legislative power would enable it to do.
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step is more problematic. It is the inference that the powers specified cannot
authorize any and all legislation that Congress might pass under the circumstances of a given time. That second step is the one that purports to establish
the internal-limits canon, and it does not follow automatically from the step
before, because there is no general rule by which all enumerations of authority
must exclude some action that the authorized party might take.
Suppose that I am leaving instructions for a friend who will stay in my
house while I am on vacation. I might write as follows: “You can use my shower, or you can use the kids’ shower, or you can use the guest shower.” If my
house has three showers, then this enumeration does not limit my friend’s
choices at all, and I do not intend it to. If my friend has a certain sort of analytic
mind, he might read the list, notice that the house has only three showers, and
wonder why I bothered to write a longer sentence than “You can use any
shower in the house.” But if he also has basic common sense, he will not long
be bothered by the question, because he will generate perfectly adequate explanations. Maybe I wrote the list that way to make sure he knows what all of his
options are. Or maybe I thought that giving permission to use the showers in
general might still leave him wondering whether I preferred that he use a particular one, so it made sense to emphasize his equal privilege to use any of the
three.
The enumeration of powers in Article I differs from the shower enumeration in that the powers granted in Article I were not intended to be exhaustive.
When I list all three showers in my house, I know that I am conferring authority that is in practice as broad as the authority I would confer by writing, “Use
any shower you like.” And I take it as given that the Founders—or most of
them, anyway195—understood the enumeration to give Congress less authority
than a general police power would. To appropriate the terms of the Gibbons
dictum, they presupposed something not enumerated. But it is important to
think carefully about what it means to presuppose. A presupposition is an assumption, but it is not always a requirement. The bylaws of the Wolverine
Summer Day Camp presupposed summer days with temperatures below ninety degrees; Grandfather Charles presupposed that Charlotte’s financial welfare

195.

Some leading figures read the grants of congressional power as tantamount to general legislative authority. See supra Part III. The fact that this interpretation was sometimes offered to
criticize the Constitution rather than to praise it has little bearing on whether it is an interpretation that the text will support. The point is merely that the existence of Founding-era
figures who read the enumeration as other than limiting is in tension with the idea that the
fact of enumeration necessarily betokens limitation. To be sure, the people who read the
Constitution as granting Congress something tantamount to general legislative authority
may not have read the text in the best possible way. But whether they did or not, we must
reckon with the fact that some participants in the process considered this reading correct.
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as an adult would be a function of her marriage. But neither the camp bylaws
nor Charles’s will required that those presuppositions actually describe the
world of the future, and indeed the idea of imposing such requirements would
be nonsensical. The point, of course, is that because the authors of texts are not
omniscient about the circumstances in which those texts will be applied, textual rules are sometimes applied in situations that lack some of the features that
the authors presupposed. But textual rules often make sense even when some
of their authors’ presuppositions turn out to be inapplicable, such that implementing the rules as written would still vindicate the purposes for which they
were adopted.
Imagine that the Simpsons run out of milk. Marge sends Homer to the
Kwik-E-Mart with a note that says, “Here are the kinds of milk you may buy:
2%, 1%, and skim. Do not buy any milk that is not on this list.” It is clear that
Homer is not supposed to buy whole milk, or chocolate milk, or Duff-brand
beer milk. But if Homer arrives at the Kwik-E-Mart and finds the place sold
out of all milk other than 2%, 1%, and skim, he may buy any kind of milk in the
store. He should not say, “Well, the shopping list clearly communicates to me
that I can’t buy just any milk in the store. If I were authorized to buy any milk
in the store, it wouldn’t make sense for the shopping list to be written as an
enumeration of specific authorized purchases. So let me figure out what I must
refrain from buying.” Instead, Homer should understand that the list is written
the way it is because Marge had an expectation—a presupposition—that was
not borne out in practice. And he should carry out his shopping just as he
would have, on these facts, if the shopping list had said, “Buy any milk in the
store”—not because Marge authorized Homer to buy any and all milk, but because in the applicable circumstances the scope of the limited authorization she
gave does not exclude any practically available course of action.196
None of these examples is exactly like Article I. But they should dispel the
idea that sound textual interpretation necessarily precludes reading an enumeration of particular powers to have the same effect as a grant of general power.
In the absence of some reason extrinsic to the text to read the enumeration as
limiting, the fact that the text is written as an enumeration does not require
reading it that way.
To be sure, such extrinsic reasons might exist. But establishing the existence of such a reason would require reference to something beyond the text,
and it is not clear what that something would be. For reasons described in Part
II, the demands of American federalism do not furnish such a reason, because
internal limits are neither necessary nor particularly helpful for a healthy feder196.
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al structure. For reasons described in Part III, a desire to be faithful to the
Founding design does not furnish such a reason either. And in the absence of a
good reason to treat the presupposition as a condition for the exercise of the
rule, there is no reason to read the text as contemplating a smaller grant of
power to Congress than its words indicate. Whether the power-granting texts
are properly read to confer less power in practice than would flow from a general grant of authority depends on the real-world relationship between the
powers granted and the circumstances under which Congress acts.
Consider next the argument against redundancy. It is reasonable to presume that people writing lists of rules do not intend most of those rules to be
redundant. But that is a far cry from saying that a reading on which some rules
are redundant is necessarily a misreading of the text. Some documents include
redundancies for the same reasons that speech includes redundancies. Sometimes redundancies are unintentional: writers, like speakers, are not always
precise. And sometimes redundant words are included intentionally, perhaps
for emphasis rather than for substantive meaning. (Under Article II, Section 1,
the President swears to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution.”197
These are not three separate duties that the President undertakes.) Moreover,
the Constitution was written by many people working partly in cooperation
and partly at cross-purposes, and anyone who has drafted a complex document
in a large committee knows that spare and elegant composition is often costly
to obtain. (“I know that § 12(g) is unnecessary in light of § 4(a), but Johnson is
attached to § 12(g), so I’ll keep my mouth shut so we can keep working.”) To
be sure, if one’s reading of a text causes parts of the text to do no work, it is
wise to consider whether a different reading might be better. But the conclusion that parts of a text are simply redundant cannot be categorically excluded.198 If you doubt it, try for the next twenty-four hours to read every text you
see as if it had no unnecessary clauses. Try to read just one carefully edited law
review article that way.
Once the general point that even carefully crafted texts have redundancies
is recognized, it is easy to spot redundancies in the Constitution—and not only
in the clause specifying the Presidential Oath. Consider Article I, Section 8,
Clause 6, which states that Congress has the power to provide for the punish-

197.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.

198.

I take this approach to reflect the best reading of Chief Justice Marshall’s famous statement
that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect[.]” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (emphasis added). Interpreters should not presume that the drafters intended redundancy. But a presumption against intended redundancy can be overcome, and sometimes texts are in fact redundant even when
not intended as such.
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ment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States.199
What does this clause add to the clauses granting Congress the power to issue
securities and coin in the first place? Do we think that in the absence of Clause
6 Congress could coin money but would be powerless against counterfeiters?
That seems unlikely, both because it seems contrary to common sense and because it is sharply at odds with the way other parts of Section 8 are read. No
constitutional clause expressly grants Congress the power to punish people
who fail to pay their taxes, or people who violate copyrights, but nobody
doubts that Congress has those punishment powers, whether as inherent incidents of the underlying powers to tax200 and to grant copyrights201 or as means
necessary and proper for carrying those powers into execution.202 If the Constitution did not expressly specify congressional power to punish counterfeiting,
the power would be there just the same, exactly as it is for all parallel congressional powers. So Clause 6 does no independent work.
One could reasonably accept all of the foregoing points and still think that
reading the Commerce Clause as a grant of nearly general regulatory authority
creates too much redundancy to be credible. In other words, the causes of redundancy that I identify above might explain a bit of extraneous text here and
there, but they cannot plausibly explain why most of a text—here, most of the
eighteen clauses of Section 8—is extraneous. That may be. But for reasons that
largely overlap with the reasons why a set of enumerated powers can turn out
to be indistinguishable in practice from a grant of general authority, the
amount of a document that can reasonably be read as redundant can change as
the circumstances in which the document is applied change.
Distinguish, therefore, between original redundancy and acquired redundancy. Original redundancy is redundancy that exists in a document on the day
the document is written. For the reasons given above, the best reading of a
document might find a bit of original redundancy. That said, it would be
strange for a document—or at least a document that is intended as a carefully
crafted and practically operative set of rules—to contain enormous redundancies as an original matter. Acquired redundancy, however, is the redundancy
that exists in practice when the document is applied at some later time, after
relevant conditions have changed. Imagine, for example, a New York gamepreservation statute adopted in 1800 and providing as follows: “No deer shall
be killed (1) within one day’s overland travel from Albany; or (2) within one

199.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.

200.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

201.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

202.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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day’s overland travel from New York City.” (The drafters figured that protecting deer near large population centers would reduce nonessential hunting and
preserve a food supply needed in rural areas.) The statute contains little if any
original redundancy. In 1800, most or even all places that lay within one day’s
overland travel of one of those cities were not within one day’s overland travel
of the other. Today, however, the two rules would be completely redundant.
Or consider a treaty between Britain and France, signed in 1820, providing that
neither country would maintain a naval presence “off the coast of the United
States, or that of Texas.” After 1845, the second provision would be completely
redundant. But it would be a mistake at that point to read the treaty as if the
second provision carried some meaning not entirely contained within the first.
A reading of Article I, Section 8 on which the list of enumerated powers
were shot through with original redundancies would likely be a bad reading.
There is language here and there that could have been removed without changing the substantive import of the section even in 1787,203 but by and large it is
reasonable to think that the drafters expected the several enumerated powers to
do different things. It is perfectly plausible, however, to think that the enumerated powers might feature a great deal of acquired redundancy.
This is not to say that change over time necessarily justifies reading constitutional language as redundant. How much redundancy the Commerce Clause
creates in the rest of Section 8 depends on how broadly the Commerce Clause
applies, and as already noted I am not arguing for any particular construction
of that Clause. I am simply pointing out that the appropriate constructions of
the enumerated powers, whatever they might be, need not be limited to avoid
redundancy. The idea that every piece of a text must be construed to carry its
own distinctive meaning may arise from a well-intentioned effort to have the
text make sense as a whole, but the principle of interpretation that such an effort seeks to vindicate is simply misplaced.204 If a reading produces redundan203.

See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 199. In a slightly different vein but with the same
import, the power to create tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, granted in Clause 9,
was from the beginning redundant in light of Article III, Section 1, which gives Congress the
power to create inferior courts.

204.

Perhaps the impulse to attribute some consequential import to every clause of the Constitution arises from the same sorts of venerative attitudes animating the idea that there is meaning to be found in every single word of the Bible, the Koran, and similar religious texts. But
there are, or ought to be, obvious differences in the appropriate hermeneutic assumptions
for these different enterprises. Biblical interpretation applying the principle that every word
in the document is meaningful presumes an infallible author, one who does not need to negotiate clauses with Johnson and who is omniscient about the circumstances of the future as
well as those of the present. Whether approaching the Constitution with parallel assumptions is merely untenable or also blasphemous is a question that different people will answer
differently.
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cies, it is worth thinking twice about whether one is reading correctly. But if
one can give a reasonable account of the redundancy in question, and if the
reading otherwise makes sense, there is no good reason to rule out readings
simply because they make certain pieces of text extraneous.
For all these reasons, the text of Article I, Section 8 does not require the internal-limits canon. To be sure, there is an available reading of that text that
would support the idea that the enumeration is limiting if there were good extratextual reasons to understand the enumeration that way. Much the same is
true of the text of the Tenth Amendment. But in the absence of good extratextual reasons for the internal-limits canon, the text of the Constitution does not
require it.
c o n c lu s io n
For a long time, constitutional law has featured a stable paradox whereby
courts articulated the internal-limits canon but permitted Congress to legislate
as it thought proper, within the external limits of constitutional law. It is not
clear whether that arrangement will remain stable. If it will not, the choice is
between revising our practice to match a theory and revising that theory to
match our practice. In my view, the practice is sensible and should prevail. In
that respect, my argument is conservative, in the classical or Burkean sense: it
seeks to defend the stability of a longstanding practice against the threat posed
by reformers wielding an abstraction. As measured by the conventions of constitutional discourse, my argument is radical, because it recommends the abandonment of a traditionally orthodox idea. It is the radicalism of looking at what
we are already doing, indeed at what we have done for a long time, and deciding to be at peace.
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